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GENDER VIOLENCE AND WORK:
RECKONING WITH THE BOUNDARIES OF
SEX DISCRIMINATION LAW
JULIE GOLDSCHEID*
It is uncontroverted ... that Hossack was terminated because
management feared her husband's threats and that he might very
well cause workplace disruption in the future ... [consequently]
no reasonable jury could find that the defendant terminated [her]
employment because she is a woman.
1
Workplace inequality based on sex, as well as discrimination based
on other protected characteristics, persist notwithstanding several decades
of antidiscrimination laws.2 An extensive body of scholarship examines this
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Goldfarb, Nancy Levitt, Rick Rossein, Robin Runge, Catherine Smith, and Deb Widiss for
their helpful comments. Thanks to Morgan Cashwell, Seeta Persaud, Daniela Arregui, and
Nate Treadwell for their able research assistance.
1 Hossack v. Floor Covering Assocs., 492 F.3d 853, 863 (7th Cir. 2007), reh 'g &
reh 'g en banc denied, No. 04-3990, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 23794 (7th Cir. Oct. 2, 2007).
2 According to the most recent census data, women working full time year-round
earn approximately seventy-seven cents for every dollar earned by men. U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, HISTORICAL INCOME TABLES-PEOPLE, TABLE P-40: WOMEN'S EARNINGS AS A
PERCENTAGE OF MEN'S EARNINGS BY RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: 1960 TO 2007, available at
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/p40.html. Minority women fare
significantly worse, with African American women earning just fifty-two cents for every
dollar earned by a white man, while a Hispanic woman earned only forty-three cents on the
dollar. Compare U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, 2006 ANNUAL
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SUPPLEMENT, TABLE PINC-05: WORK EXPERIENCE IN 2005-PEOPLE
15 YEARS OLD AND OVER BY TOTAL MONEY EARNINGS IN 2005, AGE, RACE, HISPANIC
ORIGIN, AND SEX, FEMALE 15 YEARS AND OVER BLACK A.O.I.C. (2006), available at
http://pubdb3.census.gov/macro/032006/perinc/new05_ 113.htm (reporting mean income for
black females as $26,916), and U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, 2006
ANNUAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SUPPLEMENT, TABLE P[NC-05: WORK EXPERIENCE IN
2005-PEOPLE 15 YEARS OLD AND OVER BY TOTAL MONEY EARNINGS IN 2005, AGE, RACE,
HISPANIC ORIGIN, AND SEX, FEMALE 15 YEARS AND OVER HISPANIC (OF ANY RACE) (2006)
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and related forms of persistent inequality and identifies a number of
approaches, such as reforms that would target cognitive bias, entrenched
structures of decision-making, and unconscious discrimination, to redress
what has been termed "second generation" employment discrimination.3
This Article takes that project in an unexplored direction. The treatment of
domestic and sexual violence 4 survivors at work often reflects a subtle5
form of sex discrimination that antidiscrimination law currently fails to
adequately reach.6 This subtle bias inevitably informs and distorts
workplace decisions involving domestic and sexual violence victims. 7 This
Article proposes a "second generation" discrimination solution that requires
employers to engage in an interactive process with survivors of gender-
based violence before taking adverse actions against them. This would
bring the issue to the surface, reduce stigma, and ensure that any adverse
employment action is based on legitimate reasons, as opposed to subtle
biases. By identifying and accounting for this nuanced manifestation of sex
discrimination, antidiscrimination law can more fully advance its goal of
eliminating sex-based inequality at work.8
available at http://pubdb3.census.gov/macro/032006/perinc/new05 1 7.htm (reporting mean
income for Hispanic women as $22,550), with U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION
SURVEY, 2006 ANNUAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SUPPLEMENT, TABLE PINC-05: WORK
EXPERIENCE IN 2005-PEOPLE 15 YEARS OLD AND OVER BY TOTAL MONEY EARNINGS IN
2005, AGE, RACE, HISPANIC ORIGIN, AND SEX, MALE 15 YEARS AND OVER WHITE ALONE,
NOT HISPANIC (2006), available at http://pubdb3.census.gov/macro/032006/perinc/
new05_058.htm (reporting mean income for white, non-Hispanic men as $52,147).
3 Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 460 (2001). See infra Parts I.A. and III.A. for further
discussion of this scholarship.
4 This Article references domestic and sexual violence alternately as gender
violence, gender-based violence, and, in the most descriptive though somewhat cumbersome
form, domestic and sexual violence.
5 This Article uses the term "subtle bias" generally to reference expressions of
gender bias that are not captured under current interpretations of antidiscrimination law.
6 For a discussion of covered and excluded cases, see Part II, infra.
7 For a discussion of the ways this subtle bias informs workplace decisions, see
Part lI.B., infra.
8 By focusing on the ways antidiscrimination law responds to the problem, this
Article's proposal would directly affect those who work in the formal labor market, in jobs
governed by Title VII, and, potentially, by state analogs that follow Title VIl's approach to
statutory interpretation. Therefore, this Article does not address the important question of
how the law could better address the impact of domestic and sexual violence on the work
lives of informal labor market employees and those who work for small employers outside
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Feminist advocacy increasingly emphasizes the economic
dimensions of gender violence as a complement to the traditional focus on
criminal justice, family law, and social service reforms. 9 United States v.
Morrison, one of the Supreme Court decisions that most explicitly analyzed
domestic and sexual violence, hinged on the proper Congressional response
to the economic effects of gender-based violence.10 Nevertheless, the legal
impact of domestic and sexual violence on women's"1 market-based
employment has received limited scholarly attention.' 2
In the last decade, policymakers, advocates, and human resources
professionals have begun to recognize the impact of domestic and sexual
violence on women's employment.' 3 A growing literature documents the
ways abusers use the workplace to perpetuate abuse, the costs of abuse to
employers, and the detrimental effects of abuse on women's employment. 14
For example, abusers may stalk their partners at work, call incessantly to
distract them from their jobs, or use coercive measures to keep them from
the reach of antidiscrimination law. See generally ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., THE
GLOVES-OFF ECONOMY: WORKPLACE STANDARDS AT THE BOTTOM OF AMERICA'S LABOR
MARKET (2008); Shirley Lung, Developing a Course on the Rights of Low-Wage Workers,
54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 380 (2004).
9 See infra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
10 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
1 Although not all domestic and sexual violence is committed against women,
this Article primarily uses female references as a generalization because the vast majority of
domestic and sexual violence victims are women. See, e.g., CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, 1993-2001,
at 1 (2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.govibjs/pub/pdf/ipv0l.pdf (concluding that
eighty-five percent of all victimizations by intimate partners in 2001 were against women);
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION 1N THE
UNITED STATES, 2006 STATISTICAL TABLES 15 tbl.2 (2008), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cvus060l.pdf [hereinafter CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION]
(reporting that eighty-eight percent of all rapes and sexual assaults in 2006 were committed
against women). However, the proposal laid out in this Article would apply to at least a
subset of the men who are victims of domestic or sexual violence as well. See infra Part
II.A.
12 See infra notes 97-103.
13 See infra Part I.B.
14 id.
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succeeding at work.15 Employers have begun to develop policies and
programs to assist victims and to promote workplace safety.16
However, even as awareness of the impact of domestic and sexual
violence in the workplace grows, and as appropriate responses expand,
women continue to be terminated, denied positions, and subjected to other
adverse job actions because of their experiences with domestic or sexual
violence. 7 Given the deep connections between gender bias and domestic
and sexual abuse, in at least some of these cases subtle bias may skew both
an employee's perception of available choices and an employer's response
if she self-identifies as experiencing abuse. As a practical matter, the
growing experience of survivors1 8 and their employers demonstrates that
both parties' interests are best served when employees feel safe enough to
disclose their experiences of abuse and work with their employer to
determine how they can most safely and productively navigate both the
abuse and their employment. 19 Yet current legal frameworks neither require
nor encourage such an approach.
To some extent, antidiscrimination law has long recognized that
sexual violence at work is a form of sex discrimination. It has been more
than twenty years since the Supreme Court ruled that sexual assault at work
creates a hostile environment that violates Title VII. 20 But domestic and
sexual violence affect women's employment in a range of ways, which
include, but are not limited to, sexual assault at work.21 Inevitably, the
ingrained, gender-based biases that inform both the circumstances in which
abuse is committed and the response victims receive from officials,
including law enforcement, health care, and employers, will inform at least
'5 See infra Part I.B. 1.
16 See infra Part I.B.3.
'v See infra Part I.B.I & II.B.
18 This Article uses the terms "survivor" and "victim" interchangeably, reflecting
both the common perception of those who experience domestic and sexual violence as"victims" and the importance of recognizing that those who have weathered the abuse should
accurately be described as "survivors."
"9 See infra Part I.B.3.
20 Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (holding that repeated sexual
assaults by supervisor constitute impermissible sex discrimination). See also infra notes
160-164.
21 See infra Part 1.B.l.
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some decisions about survivors' employment status.22 This Article proposes
a more robust interpretation of antidiscrimination law's sex bias
prohibitions that would require engagement and negotiation between
employer and employee about workplace issues that result from abuse.
Requiring antidiscrimination law to more fully account for the
nuanced expressions of sex discrimination is important for a number of
reasons. As an initial matter, it allows antidiscrimination law to more
meaningfully fulfill its goal of eliminating discrimination in the workplace.
This approach also incentivizes workplace policies that encourage
interactive problem-solving. Businesses and human resources professionals
increasingly recognize that such policies promote safe and productive
workplaces. Moreover, it holds transformative potential by exposing the
gender bias that continues to inform domestic and sexual violence.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the literature on
unconscious bias and how it can be applied to the circumstances that
survivors of gender violence encounter when they try to maintain their jobs
in the face of abuse. It summarizes that body of literature and links it to the
extensive scholarship framing domestic and sexual violence as a form of
sex discrimination. It then grounds the problem of gender violence and
work in studies and statistics detailing the ways gender violence impacts the
workplace. It places the discussion of antidiscrimination law in context by
surveying the range of applicable laws and recent legislative initiatives as
well as the emerging scholarly commentary. It describes the workplace
policies and practices that best address the issue. This discussion highlights
the importance of workplace policies that encourage victims to disclose
their experiences of abuse, but do not require them to do so. That disclosure
enables employees and employers to engage in good faith dialogue about
how best to implement safety measures that can both reduce the risk of
violence in the workplace and promote victims' employment security.
Part II discusses the application of antidiscrimination law. It
analyzes the common situations in which domestic and sexual violence
result in adverse actions against victims. It categorizes cases that are
covered, versus those that are excluded, under current antidiscrimination
paradigms. These cases demonstrate the ways that subtle gender bias
negatively impacts women's employment in cases involving abuse-related
workplace issues.
Part III proposes a framework under which antidiscrimination law
can better account for subtle forms of sex discrimination associated with
domestic and sexual violence. Antidiscrimination law should recognize
22 See infra Part I.B.
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unexplained adverse actions taken against victims of domestic and sexual
violence as sex discrimination if those actions are taken without a good
faith negotiation between the employer and employee. Assuming an
employee facing employment issues has voluntarily disclosed her
experience with abuse, her employer would engage in an interactive process
about employment issues and whether a modest accommodation would
facilitate her ongoing safe and productive employment. By requiring a
conversation with the victim, this approach would interrupt the operation of
subtle bias. Absent a required interaction, employers often react reflexively
and overreact to survivors' employment-related issues. Although a similar
result could be accomplished through statutory reform that, for example,
explicitly prohibited adverse actions against survivors absent reasonable
accommodation, the proposed framework advances both the instrumental
goal of better ensuring women's equality, and the normative goal of
interpreting antidiscrimination law in a way that responds to the nuanced
realities of discrimination.
I. UNCONSCIOUS BIAS, GENDER VIOLENCE, AND WORK
Domestic and sexual violence advocates, academics, and
policymakers have in recent years begun to highlight the economic impact
of domestic and sexual abuse. This shift has been sparked by a growing
recognition of the limitations of the criminal justice system23 and also by
mounting evidence that a woman's economic independence is one of the
best predictors of whether she will seek and maintain safety in the aftermath
of abuse.24 Since work is central to economic security, and given the
23 See, e.g., Naomi Cahn, Policing Women: Moral Arguments and the Dilemmas
of Criminalization, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 817 (2000); Donna Coker, Crime Control and
Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Violence Law: A Critical Review, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
801, 840-41, 858-60 (2001); Jenny Rivera, Domestic Violence Against Latinas by Latino
Males: An Analysis of Race, National Origin, and Gender Differentials, 14 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 231, 243-51 (1994); Nina W. Tarr, Employment and Economic Security for
Victims of Domestic Abuse, 16 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 371 (2007); Deborah M.
Weissman, The Personal is Political-and Economic: Rethinking Domestic Violence, 2007
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 387, 398-403.
24 See, e.g., HUGH WATERS ET AL., WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, THE ECONOMIC
DIMENSIONS OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE (2004), available at
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2004/9241591609.pdf, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, NAT'L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, COSTS OF INTIMATE PARTNER
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES (2003), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/pub-res/ipv cost/IPVBook-Final-Feb18.pdf [hereinafter CDC
STUDY]; DONNA GRECO & SARAH DAWGERT, PA. COAL. AGAINST RAPE, POVERTY AND
[Vol. 18:1
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prevalence of gender violence--committed predominantly by men against
women 25-the impact of domestic and sexual violence on women's work is
a key issue for both safety and equality. 26 Moreover, survivors of gender
violence inevitably will be subjected to the outdated, gendered stereotypes
that surround abuse, both inside and outside the workplace.2 7 Data
indicating that survivors of domestic and sexual violence often lose their
jobs or suffer other employment-related losses as a result of the abuse
highlight the importance of further inquiry into the ways that workplace
responses to survivors may perpetuate women's inequality.
At the same time, recent employment law scholarship recognizes
and critiques the limits of antidiscrimination law's traditional disparate
treatment, disparate impact, and facial discrimination theories for ridding
the workplace of impermissible bias.28 Instead of deliberate discrimination,
cognitive bias, structures of decision-making, and patterns of interactions
increasingly are recognized as driving and perpetuating inequality at
work.29 Numerous scholars draw on social psychology studies as a basis for
arguments that antidiscrimination law's traditional focus on intentional
discrimination is inadequate and instead should take into account the role of
implicit bias.3° Indeed, Christine Jolls and Cass Sunstein have characterized
the legal literature on implicit bias as "enormous.'
SEXUAL VIOLENCE: BUILDING ADVOCACY AND INTERVENTION RESPONSES (2007), available at
http://www.pcar.org/resources/poverty.pdf.
25 See CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, supra note 11, at 15 tbl.2.
26 See Emily F. Rothman et al., How Employment Helps Female Victims of
Intimate Partner Violence: A Qualitative Study, 12 J. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH PSYCHOL. 136,
138-42 (2007) (concluding based on empirical study that work helps victims by improving
finances, promoting physical safety, increasing self esteem, improving social connectedness,
providing mental respite, and providing motivation or a "purpose in life"). See also, e.g.,
infra Parts l.B.1 & I.B.3.
27 See infra Part II.B. 1.
28 Susan Sturm has termed these challenges "second generation" manifestations of
workplace bias. Sturm, supra note 3, at 460.
29 Id.
30 See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a
Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 95-99
(2003); Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda H. Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations,
94 CAL. L. REV. 945 (2006); Melissa Hart, Subjective Decision-Making and Unconscious
Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741, 745-50 (2005); Linda H. Krieger & Susan T. Fiske,
Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate
Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997 (2006); Linda H. Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A
Columbia Journal of Gender and Law
This Part first demonstrates the importance of antidiscrimination
law to domestic and sexual violence survivors. It shows how emerging
understandings of implicit bias open the door to re-examining the subtle
operation of impermissible biases, including gender bias. It then grounds
the argument for analyzing the reactions that survivors of gender violence
face at work through the lens of antidiscrimination law by reviewing the
global literature recognizing gender bias as a form of sex discrimination.
This Part next describes the problems that gender violence victims face at
work more fully, by presenting social science and statistical data, legal and
scholarly responses, and the growing body of human resources materials
recommending best practices in response to the problem.
A. Surfacing Subtle Discrimination: Why Anti discrimination Law
Matters
Recent scholarship describing the role of unconscious or implicit
bias adds a new lens through which to reconsider the role and application of
antidiscrimination law. At the risk of oversimplification, a central premise
of the implicit bias literature is that stereotypes and biases are natural
cognitive responses employed by everyone, not just "prejudiced" people, to
categorize information in a complex world.3 2 The research demonstrates
that these stereotypes and biases affect inter-group judgment and decision-
making, and generally operate unintentionally. 33  Stereotypes
subconsciously predispose the stereotype holder to perceive, characterize,
34and behave toward a stereotyped target in stereotype-consistent ways.
Legal rules can counter these unconscious biases by, for example,
prohibiting implicit biases from affecting workplace decisions. 35 Research
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN.
L. REV. 1161 (1995); Charles R. Lawrence 11, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Ann C. McGinley, i Viva
La Evoluci6n!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y
415, 421-26 (2000); David B. Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV.
899, 901 (1993).
31 Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law ofImplicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV.
969, 975 n.31 (2006).
32 Krieger, supra note 30, at 1187-88.
33 Id.
34 Krieger & Fiske, supra note 30, at 1032-33.
35 Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 31, at 977-88. Jolls and Sunstein group their
proposals into three categories: those in which law or policy insulates outcomes from the
[Vol. 18:1
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indicating that contact with people who are the subject of stereotypes helps
to reduce bias offers support for initiatives that increase population diversity
in workplaces, educational institutions, and other organizations. 36 Similarly,
research indicating that recurrent positive imagery can reduce implicit bias
suggests the use of workplace training that includes positive imagery of
historically stereotyped groups. 37 Along similar lines, parties in workplace
discrimination litigation should be permitted to argue that implicit
stereotypes produced purportedly discriminatory employment decisions. 38
Other approaches focus on structural forms of bias and demonstrate
that patterns of interaction lead to the exclusion of non-dominant groups.3 9
Under that view, complex organizational cultures perpetuate exclusion;
accordingly, discrimination can be fully discerned only when examined in
relation to broader patterns of conduct and access. 40 The absence of
systematic institutional reflection about these insidious patterns contributes
to their cumulative effect. 41 Therefore, some scholars advocate a problem-
solving approach that relies on institutional actors to systemically reflect on
the patterns of exclusion and to create institution-specific responses.4 2
Viewed broadly through the lens of this body of scholarship, the
workplace impact of domestic and sexual violence can be seen as a form of"second generation discrimination" that reflects and perpetuates women's
inequality. Domestic and sexual violence may appear to be "gender
neutral," in that these acts may be committed by and against both women
and men. In reality, though, they are inextricably connected to gender
discrimination in a general, rather than an individual sense, by virtue of
their disproportionate impact on women as victims, the surrounding social
and historical context, and the responses victims often receive from law
effects of implicit bias; those in which legal or policy dictates directly reduce implicit bias;
and those termed "indirect debiasing mechanisms" in which law encourages or enables
regulated actors to take steps that reduce implicit bias. Id. at 989.
36 Id. at 981.
31 Id. at 983-84.
38 Krieger & Fiske, supra note 30, at 1061.
39 Sturm, supra note 3, at 468-69.
40 Id. at 471.
41 Id.
42 Id. Sturm goes on to offer examples of the "dynamic regulatory regime" she
proposes. Id. at 489-520.
2008]
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enforcement, health care personnel, and other institutional actors.43 To
better address the full range of cases in which women's work is affected by
bias, antidiscrimination law should require a more searching analysis of
whether domestic and sexual violence victims' employment is adversely
affected because of gender.
Another reason to closely investigate and analyze the ways
workplace treatment of domestic and sexual violence victims constitutes
sex discrimination lies in the value of publicly and formally framing
domestic and sexual violence in terms of its connection with sex
discrimination.44 In the past decade, employer awareness of the workplace
impacts of domestic and sexual violence has expanded, workplace policies
have been developed, and public policy increasingly addresses the problem.
These are critical developments. However, much of this reform is cast in
terms of cost reduction and safety.45 Those concerns are critically
important, both as ends in themselves and for their instrumental value in
producing critical programmatic and policy developments. But to the extent
that workplace interventions are framed solely, or even primarily, in terms
of workplace safety and productivity, and not in terms of sex
discrimination, something is lost. Though it may be politically unpopular to
talk in terms of discrimination, given backlash against existing protections,
employer fatigue about antidiscrimination laws, and fears of unchecked
liability, something is lost if the problem, and the accompanying legal
responses, are framed solely in the gender-neutral terms of services and
safety.46 These concerns are of course appropriate and important, but not to
43 See infra notes 47-55 and accompanying text.
44 For further discussion on how framing domestic and sexual violence as a
problem of equality can help shift public perception of the problem see, e.g., ELIZABETH M.
SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 27-28, 34-49 (2000), Sally F.
Goldfarb, Applying the Discrimination Model to Violence Against Women: Some Reflections
on Theory and Practice, 1 J. GENDER, SOC. POL'Y & L. 251, 254-59 (2003); G. Kristian
Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the Conservatization
of the Battered Women's Movement, 42 Hous. L. REV. 237 (2005). See also, e.g., Julie
Goldscheid, Elusive Equality in Domestic and Sexual Violence Law Reform, 34 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 731, 763-67, 776-77 (2007).
45 See infra Part 1.B.3.
46 For discussion of the mainstreaming of the anti-domestic violence movement
and its attendant limitations, see, for example, LISA A. GOODMAN & DEBORAH EPSTEIN,
LISTENING TO BATTERED WOMEN 36-47 (2008). Recent initiatives reassert the importance of
addressing the social context of abuse. See, e.g., NATIONAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HOTLINE,
DECADE FOR CHANGE SUMMIT REPORT 10, 29-31 (2007), available at
http://www.ndvh.org/decadeforchange/Decade%20for/ 20Change%20SUMMIT%2Report.
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the exclusion of dialogue about the ways domestic and sexual violence is
rooted in gender-based inequality.
Authorities ranging from the United Nations to the United States
Congress recognize that domestic and sexual violence are inextricably
linked to formal and informal manifestations of sex discrimination.47
International legal instruments recognize domestic and sexual violence as
forms of sex discrimination.48 Domestic violence continues to be committed
overwhelmingly by men against women, in the United States49 and
elsewhere around the world. 50 The nature of the violence itself also is
deeply gendered. It is committed in the context of cultural norms
sanctioning or ignoring male violence against women, and in a legal
tradition that historically countenanced such abuse. 5' The circumstances
pdf [hereinafter DECADE FOR CHANGE] (recognizing the importance of social context in
addressing domestic violence).
47 See, e.g., Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A.
Res. 48/104, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (Dec. 20, 1993) (stating that violence against women
is an "obstacle to the achievement of equality" and that it "constitutes a violation of the
rights and fundamental freedoms of women," and recognizing that "violence against women
is a manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men and women, which
have led to domination over and discrimination against women by men."); Global AIDS &
Tuberculosis Relief Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-264, § 122, 114 Stat. 748, codified as 22
U.S.C. § 6822 (2009) (grant program implicitly recognizing rape and sexual assault as a
form of gender-based violence); see also, e.g., International Violence Against Women Act of
2007, S. 2279, 110th Cong. § 4(1) (2007) (defining gender-based violence as including, inter
alia, domestic and sexual violence).
48 See, e.g., Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981); Committee on
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 11 th Sess., General Recommendation
No. 19 (1992), available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/
recomm.htm.
49 See RENNISON, supra note 11, at 1.
50 See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, MULTI-COUNTRY STUDY ON WOMEN'S
HEALTH AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN (2005), available at
http://www.who.int/gender/violence/whomulticountrystudy/en/index.html (comparing
data from fifteen cites in ten countries).
51 For a discussion of the gendered context of domestic and sexual violence, see,
e.g., SCHNEIDER, supra note 44, at 13-23; SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE:
THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES OF THE BAT-FERED WOMEN'S MOVEMENT (1982); Sally F.
Goldfarb, Violence Against Women and the Persistence of Privacy, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1
(2000); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J.
1281 (1991); and see also, e.g., Julie Goldscheid, Domestic and Sexual Violence as Sex
Discrimination: Comparing American and International Approaches, 28 T. JEFFERSON L.
REV. 355, 358-62 (2006) (collecting sources).
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associated with particular acts of abuse often, though not always, reveal
perpetrators' conscious or unconscious biases.52 The attitudes of law
enforcement officers, health care providers, and employers also reflect
gender-based biases that continue to animate treatment of survivors.13
Authorities including the Centers for Disease Control recognize that the
culture of masculinity and enduring biased beliefs, attitudes, and
perceptions of women fuel a culture in which domestic and sexual violence,
committed primarily against women, persist.54
Employers' responses to domestic and sexual violence victims
inevitably will be informed, and, in at least some cases, skewed, by the
gender-based biases that continue to surround domestic and sexual
violence. 55 These attitudes may be explicit in some cases, but in others may
underlie what may appear to be gender-neutral actions. Discerning
actionable bias is complex, but it lies at the heart of antidiscrimination laws'
mandate.
52 See, e.g., Goldscheid, supra note 44, at 773 n.196 (citing cases); see also Walter
S. DeKeseredy & Molly Dragiewicz, Understanding the Complexities of Feminist
Perspectives on Woman Abuse, 13 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 874, 875, 877-78 (2007)
(summarizing research and refuting arguments that domestic violence is not gendered).
53 See, e.g., Nat'l Judicial Educ. Project, Gender Bias Task Forces: Summary and
Recommendations, http://www.nowldef.org/html/njep/findings.shtml (last visited Apr. 8,
2009) (summarizing reports of thirty-one state and federal gender-bias task forces, including
findings about gender bias in cases involving violence against women); see also, e.g.,
Goldscheid, supra note 44, at 773 n.197 (citing examples from law enforcement); Judicial
Inquiry & Rev. Comm'n of Va. v. Shull, 651 S.E.2d 648, 659 (Va. 2007) (removing judge
from bench following judge's admission that he "probably" advised a female litigant, who
alleged that her boyfriend had inflicted bruises on her, that "if you married this guy, it would
remove an impediment [regarding custody of your children]"; and that he had required a
woman to pull down her pants in court so that he could see her wound before he agreed to
extend a protective order against her estranged husband).
54 See, e.g., Ctr. for Disease Control and Prevention, Domestic Violence
Prevention Enhancement and Leadership Through Alliances (DELTA),
http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/DELTA/default.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2009) (describing
prevention-oriented program involving ten demonstration projects addressing, inter alia, the
societal factors underlying domestic and sexual abuse). For a discussion of one program that
treats domestic violence as a form of sexism, see Cindy Rodriguez, Class Teaches Respect
for Women to Batterers (WNYC radio broadcast Aug. 14, 2008), available at
http://www.wnyc.org/news/articles/105891.
15 See infra Part II.B. 1.
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B. Grounding the Problem of Gendered Violence and Work
To more fully describe the connections between gender bias, gender
violence, and work, this Section reviews social science and statistical data,
legal and scholarly responses, and the growing human body of resource
materials recommending best practices in response to the problem.
1. Backgro und Data
A growing literature documents the complex and often hidden ways
that domestic and sexual violence affect the workplace.56 Statistics
consistently show that one in four women will be assaulted by an intimate
partner in her lifetime, while one in six women will experience a completed
or attempted rape.57 Given the high rate of women's workplace
participation, the odds are high that at any time a sizable percentage of a
given employer's workforce will be subjected to domestic or sexual
violence. This impacts the workplace in a variety of ways. Abusers may
commit acts of domestic or sexual violence at the workplace, sometimes
with tragic results.58 Workers may be sexually assaulted at work by
supervisors, coworkers, or clients. Workplace violence is increasingly
56 See, e.g., CDC STUDY, supra note 24, at 30, 42; CHRISTINE LINDQUIST ET. AL.,
CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, INVENTORY OF WORKPLACE INTERVENTIONS
DESIGNED TO PREVENT INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 1-1 (2006) [hereinafter CDC
INVENTORY]; Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Survey of
Workplace Violence Prevention 2005 (Oct. 27, 2006) 2 tbl.l, available at
http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/osch0033.pdf [hereinafter Survey of Workplace Violence
Prevention] (showing percent of establishments reporting an incident of domestic violence in
the previous year); DECADE FOR CHANGE, supra note 46 (recognizing impact of domestic
violence on employment and recommending set of responses). For a collection of studies,
see, e.g., Deborah A. Widiss, Domestic Violence and the Workplace: The Explosion of State
Legislation and the Need for a Comprehensive Strategy, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 669, 675-80
(2008).
57 PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FULL REPORT OF
THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 13, 26
(2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/183781.pdf.
58 See, e.g., Robin H. Thompson, Domestic Violence and its Effects on the
Workplace, in THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON YOUR LEGAL PRACTICE 364 (Am. Bar
Ass'n Comm'n on Domestic Violence ed., 2d ed. 2004) [hereinafter IMPACT ON YOUR LEGAL
PRACTICE]; Stacey P. Dougan & Kimberly K. Wells, Domestic Violence: Workplace Policies
and Management Strategies, 7 A.B.A. COMM'N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE E-NEWSLETTER I
(2007). See also infra note 85 (sources citing cases).
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recognized as a drain on productivity and morale; 59 domestic and sexual
violence figures prominently as part of that equation. For example,
homicide is the leading cause of death for female workers, 60 and sixteen
percent of those homicides reportedly were the result of domestic
violence. 61 Nearly a quarter of businesses surveyed by the United States
Department of Labor in 2000 reported having experienced an incident of
workplace violence stemming from domestic violence over the previous
year.62
Domestic and sexual violence that occur outside of work also affect
the workplace. The central issues in domestic violence are power,
dominance, and control, rather than violence per se.63 A batterer's need to
control may cause him to challenge steps his target makes towards financial
independence.64 Accordingly, he may engage in a range of behaviors that
will undermine her ability to succeed in work, school, or other trainingprograms.65 Researchers increasingly are identifying economic abuse as a
distinct, but pervasive, form of abuse.66
59 See infra notes 77-82 and accompanying text; see also Nicole B. Porter,
Victimizing the Abused? Is Termination the Solution When Domestic Violence Comes to
Work?, 12 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 275, 276-77 (2006) (referencing studies).
60 NAT'L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH, HOMICIDE IN THE
WORKPLACE (1996), available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/violhomi.htmi (analyzing data
from 1980-1992).
61 Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Women Experience Fewer Job-
related Injuries and Deaths than Men, ISSUES IN LABOR STATISTICS (July 1998), available at
http://www.bls.gov/opub/ils/pdf/opbils23.pdf.
62 Survey of Workplace Violence Prevention, supra note 56, at 2 tbl. 1.
63 See, e.g., EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: HOW MEN ENTRAP WOMEN IN
PERSONAL LIFE (2007); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining
the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 53-60 (1991); Tarr, supra note 23, at 385 (citing
sources).
64 Tarr, supra note 23, at 386. Some programs have begun to address the ways
abusers use economic control to prevent victims from attaining independence by offering
financial and economic empowerment information to victims. See, e.g., Economics Against
Abuse Program, http://www.econempowerment.org (last visited Apr. 8, 2009).
65 Tarr, supra note 23, at 376-77 (listing tactics such as: harassing her in the
workplace in person, on the phone, and by email; causing her to be late; undermining her
transportation; interfering with her child care arrangements); see also Maria A. Calaf,
Breaking the Cycle: Title VII, Domestic Violence, and Workplace Discrimination, 21 LAW &
INEQ. 167, 170-71 (2003) (same); accord GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:
PREVALENCE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPLOYMENT AMONG WELFARE RECIPIENTS (1998),
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Recent studies offer a snapshot of the ways batterers interfere with
their partners' work. One revealed that abusers' "pre-work" tactics, such as
physically restraining a partner from going to work, beating her severely
enough that she could not or did not want to go to work, keeping her from
sleeping, making a car unavailable, or cutting up work clothes, prevented
fifty-six percent of women in that study from going to work.67 Abusers also
interfered at work by showing up at the workplace, making harassing phone
calls to victims and their supervisors, and stalking from places outside, but
nearby, the workplace.68 In one example, a batterer kept his target on the
phone for hours.69 These findings confirm previous studies finding that
between thirty-five and fifty-six percent of employed battered women were
harassed at work by their batterers, and that fifty-five to eighty-five percent
missed work because of the abuse.7° Similarly, the Society for Human
Resource Management reported that eleven percent of employees reported
facing violence from a girlfriend or boyfriend at work, while ten percent
71reported violence from a spouse and seven percent from a former spouse.
Abusers' tactics jeopardize women's jobs in both direct and indirect
ways. One recent study found that over ninety percent of the employed
battered women surveyed had either resigned or been terminated as a result
available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/he99012.pdf [hereinafter GAO STUDY]
(describing abusers' tactics and citing studies); see also, infra notes 67-71.
66 Adrienne E. Adams et al., Development of the Scale of Economic Abuse, 14
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 563 (2008) (reviewing literature and explaining development of
instrument to measure economic abuse).
67 Jennifer E. Swanberg & T.K. Logan, Domestic Violence and Employment: A
Qualitative Study, 10 J. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH PSYCHOL. 3, 6-8 (2005).
68 Id. at 6-8.
69 Id. at 10.
70 GAO STUDY, supra note 65, at 7-9, 18-19 (summarizing studies). For other
studies similarly recounting abusive tactics that interfere with women's work, see Angela M.
Moe & Myrtle P. Bell, Abject Economics: The Effects of Battering and Violence on Women's
Work and Employability, 10 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 29 (2004) (detailing tactics and
demonstrating that battering impacts women's work and employability across various
employment levels and backgrounds). See also Carol Reeves & Ann M. O'Leary-Kelly, The
Effects and Costs of Intimate Partner Violence for Work Organizations, 22 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 327 (2007) (reporting on a workplace-based survey that revealed
that victims of intimate partner violence were more likely than non-victims to be absent, and
that current victims report higher levels of distraction at work than non-victims).
71 SOC'Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., WORKPLACE VIOLENCE SURVEY 5 (2004).
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of the abuse in the previous two years.72 Virtually all of those who resigned
did so without giving adequate notice, for reasons including their shame
about their appearance after being physically abused, fears for their
children's safety if they had to leave them with the batterer, or
embarrassment about their batterer's harassing behavior on the job.73 Over
forty percent of women in that study were terminated from at least one job
in the previous two years, either due to abuse-related poor attendance or
poor performance, or their abuser's harassment at work.74 This is consistent
with previous studies finding, for example, that twenty-four to fifty-two
percent of battered women surveyed had lost their jobs as a result of the
abuse.75 It is not surprising that the Centers for Disease Control recently
estimated that among the costs of domestic violence were $5.8 billion in
productivity losses and health care costs. 76
Even if a batterer does not harass her at work, a woman navigating
an abusive relationship may need time off for court dates or medical
appointments. She may need time to find new housing, childcare, or other
services if she is relocating in an effort to separate from the abuser. This
may jeopardize her status at work, because the time off may cause
performance problems or may force her to exceed sick day or leave
allotments. Her need for time off will be particularly problematic if she
does not feel safe enough to disclose the reason for her absence. Ultimately,
like an abuser's harassment at work, lateness and absence associated with
abuse also may cause her to lose her job.
Other studies focus on the impact of sexual assault. The Center for
Disease Control found that over twenty percent of women who were raped
and over seventeen percent of those physically assaulted by an intimate
partner lost time from paid work, totaling over 561,000 lost days of work
per year. 77 Victims who were raped or physically assaulted lost an average
72 Swanberg & Logan, supra note 67, at 9.
" Id. at 10.
74 Id.
75 GAO STUDY, supra note 65, at 7-9, 18-19 (summarizing studies).
76 See CDC STUDY, supra note 24; see also BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, SPECIAL
REPORT No. 32, VIOLENCE AND STRESS: THE WORK-FAMILY CONNECTION 2 (1990)
(estimating that domestic violence costs employers between three and five billion dollars
annually).
77 CDC STUDY, supra note 24, at 19, 42 tbl.14.
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of seven to eight days of paid work as a result of the crime. 78 The overall
value of rape victims' lost productivity resulting from lost days of work has
been estimated to be over $580 million each year.79
Few studies have analyzed the specific impact of sexual assault on
victims' continued employment. However, the one published study to
address the issue found that one half of sexual assault victims studied
reported losing their job in the aftermath of the assault.80 This is consistent
with an informal study of sexual assault victims who were working at the
time of the incident, which also revealed that over half of them either lost
income, had to take time off without pay, or had to quit as a result.81
Many employers have begun to recognize that domestic and sexual
violence negatively affect their "bottom line" and expose them to potential
liability. 82 A number have accordingly adopted policies and developed
programs to assist domestic and sexual violence victims.8 3 Notably, the
human resources literature predominantly addresses the impact of domestic
violence, and not sexual assault. 84 In part, this may be explained by the
78 id.
'9 Id. at 40 tbl. 12.
80 S. REP. No. 103-138, at 54 (1993) (citing Elizabeth Ellis et al., An Assessment of
the Long Term Reaction to Rape, 90 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 263, 264 (1981)); see also
Karen S. Calhoun et. al, Social Adjustment in Victims of Sexual Assault, 49 J. CONSULTING &
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 705, 710 (1981) (analyzing impact of sexual assault on victims' social
adjustment and finding that work was the area of functioning affected for the longest period
of time following the assault, as compared with social and leisure activities, and relations
with marital, parental, and family units, or extended family).
81 Safe Horizon, Rape and Sexual Assault: Effects of Incident on Employment and
School (2003) (survey results on file with author).
82 See, e.g., SOC'Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., supra note 71, at 6.
83 Perhaps the most visible and organized employer response to the problem to
date is the Corporate Alliance to End Partner Violence, http://www.caepv.org (last visited
Apr. 8, 2009).
84 This disparity is troublesome. Of course, the distinction between domestic and
sexual violence is, to some extent, misleading, given that most sexual assaults are committed
by acquaintances. CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, supra note 11, at 56 tbl.43 (approximately
sixty-eight percent of rapes and sexual assaults are committed by acquaintances, relatives,
and intimates). However, not all sexual assaults fit into the rubric of domestic violence, and
victims may have different needs and experiences. An analysis of why domestic violence
seems to have garnered more traction than sexual assault in public discussions no doubt
would shed light on the enduring nature of the gender biases associated with both forms of
violence. That analysis, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
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publicity surrounding cases in which abusers commit acts of violence at
work, prompting the phrase that domestic violence "comes to work., 8 ' The
impact of sexual assault on the workplace has commanded less public
attention, although it is no less important. Legislative and public policy
initiatives increasingly address both domestic and sexual violence. 86
Although some of the workplace issues surrounding domestic violence and
sexual assault differ, this Section addresses them together where
appropriate. This is based on the premises that domestic and sexual violence
are committed on a continuum of violence that is committed primarily by
men against women, that both are rooted in gender-based bias, and that the
responses of officials, including employers, to both reflect related gender-
based stereotypes.
2. Law Reform and Legal Scholarship
The complex dynamics produced when abuse impacts the
workplace implicate tort law, workers' compensation, workplace safety
regulations, leave provisions, unemployment insurance, and wrongful
discharge and antidiscrimination laws.87  Courts grapple with the
85 For a discussion of those cases, see John E. Matejkovic, Which Suit Would You
Like? The Employer's Dilemma in Dealing with Domestic Violence, 33 CAP. U.L. REV. 309
(2004); Stephanie L. Perin, Employers May Have to Pay When Domestic Violence Goes to
Work, 18 REV. LITIG. 365 (1999); see also, e.g., Tarr, supra note 23, at 377 (citing State v.
Byars, 823 So.2d 740, 741 (Fla. 2002), in which a defendant violated a domestic violence
injunction prohibiting him from entering the shop where his wife worked, and murdered
her); Christi Lowe, Shootings Shine Spotlight on Domestic Violence, WRAL, Apr. 2, 2009,
http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/4876987/ (reporting investigation into whether
domestic violence was cause of shootings at North Carolina nursing home, given reports by
gunman's estranged wife and her mother that the couple had a history of domestic violence).
86 See, e.g., Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization
Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960 (2006).
87 For articles surveying the applicability of existing laws, see Calaf, supra note
65 (focusing on Title VII remedies); Andrea Giampetro-Meyer et al., Raped at Work. Just
Another Slip, Twist, and Fall Case?, 11 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 67 (2000); Matejkovic, supra
note 85; Sandra S. Park, Working Towards Freedom from Abuse: Recognizing a "Public
Policy" Exception to Employment-At- Will for Domestic Violence Victims, 59 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 121 (2003) (addressing wrongful discharge claims); Perin, supra note 85;
Porter, supra note 59; Jill C. Robertson, Addressing Domestic Violence in the Workplace: An
Employer's Responsibility, 16 LAW & INEQ. 633 (1998); Robin R. Runge, Employment Rights
of Sexual Assault Victims, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 299 (2006); Tarr, supra note 23, at 391;
Wendy R. Weiser & Deborah A. Widiss, Employment Protection for Domestic Violence
Victims, 38 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 3 (2004); Widiss, supra note 56; see also, e.g., Ellen M.
Bublick, Tort Suits Filed by Rape and Sexual Assault Victims in Civil Courts: Lessons for
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applicability of these laws to cases in which domestic and sexual violence
victims, for example, allege that their employer bears liability for damages
when negligent security practices permit an abuser to commit an act of
violence at work;88 seek leave from work to cope with the abuse; 89 file for
unemployment benefits if they have been terminated as a result; 90 or assert
that their termination violated public policy. 91
Recently, a number of jurisdictions have considered, and in some
cases, enacted, abuse-specific legislation that provide specific protections
for victims. 92 For example, some new laws explicitly mandate provision of
leave time to address the abuse,93 payment of unemployment insurance
benefits to survivors who leave their jobs or are terminated as a result of
abuse,94 and require development of workplace policies addressing the
problem. 95  Other provisions prohibit employment and housing
discrimination against victims. 96
Courts, Classrooms and Constituencies, 59 SMU L. REV. 55 (2006) (discussing employer
tort liability for rape and sexual assault).
88 These cases tend to bring the most media attention to the issue. For a fuller
discussion of the tort liability that may arise when an abuser commits an act of violence at
work, see generally, Matejkovic, supra note 85; Perin, supra note 85.
89 See Tarr, supra note 23, at 413; Weiser & Widiss, supra note 87, at 7-10;
Widiss, supra note 56, at 695.
90 Rebecca Smith, Richard W. McHugh & Robin R. Runge, Unemployment
Insurance and Domestic Violence: Learning from our Experiences, 1 SEATTLE J. FOR Soc.
JUST. 503 (2002).
91 See Park, supra note 87; Widiss, supra note 56, at 713.
92 See Widiss, supra note 56. For fact sheets listing new and proposed laws, see
Legal Momentum, Employment and Housing Rights for Victims of Domestic Violence:
State Law Guides, http://www.legalmomentum.org/site/PageServer?pagename=erhdv_16
(follow "For Survivors: State Law Guides" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 8, 2009).
93 See Legal Momentum, Time Off from Work for Victims of Domestic or Sexual
Violence (Aug. 2004), http://www.legalmomentum.org/site/DocServer/leave.pdf.
94 See Legal Momentum, Unemployment Insurance Benefits (Feb. 2008),
http://www.legalmomentum.org/site/DocServer/UItfeb_08.pdf.
95 See Legal Momentum, Domestic and Sexual Violence Workplace Policies (July
2007), http://www.legalmomentum.org/site/DocServer/policies.pdf.
96 See Legal Momentum, Employment Rights for Victims of Domestic and Sexual
Violence (May 2008), http:l/www.legalmomentum.org/site/DocServer/Employment Rights.
May.08.pdfdocID=2721; Legal Momentum, Housing Discrimination Against Victims of
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Of the small but developing body of legal scholarship addressing
the appropriate legal response, a number of articles focus on employers'
potential tort liability when an abuser commits an act of violence at the
workplace. 97 Others analyze the applicability of antidiscrimination laws and
reach varying conclusions about the current availability of remedies under
Title VII's traditional theories of recovery. For example, Tarr concludes
that federal law offers few, if any, remedies for domestic violence.98 She
argues instead that legal responses that strike a balance between
protectionism and autonomy will best serve survivors' needs. 99 Calaf argues
that the disparate impact theory offers the most useful approach for
employees terminated as a result of abuse."'0 Porter focuses on the
dilemmas employers face when balancing the workplace safety risks
domestic violence can pose. 0 1 After identifying the weaknesses in
traditional disparate treatment and disparate impact theories, she draws
from the Americans with Disabilities Act and argues that a victim of abuse
permissibly could be terminated if her abuser creates a sufficiently serious
workplace safety risk.10 2 Widiss describes the possibilities and limitations of
current disparate treatment and impact theories in her analysis of the
emerging legislative responses.l13
This Article argues that these scholars too quickly dismiss the
applicability of existing antidiscrimination law. Survivors necessarily will
invoke a range of traditional and recent legislative and common law
remedies to redress the harms resulting from the impact of gender violence
Domestic and Sexual Violence (Aug. 2008), http://www.legalmomentum.org/site/
DocServer/Housing_02 27 07.pdf'?doclD=1041.
97 See, e.g., Matejkovic, supra note 85; Perin, supra note 85.
98 Tarr, supra note 23, at 391-95.
9' Id at 426-27.
100 Calaf, supra note 65, at 186-91. See infra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
101 Porter, supra note 59, at 320-25.
102 Id. at 327-29. Porter would support a survivor's termination if the abuser poses
a "direct threat." Id. at 328. According to Porter, the "direct threat" analysis requires that
four factors be met: 1) the duration of the risk; 2) the likelihood that the potential harm will
occur; (3) the nature and severity of the potential harm; and 4) the imminence of the
potential harm. Id. The question of the appropriate balance between employee job security
and employer discretion to terminate an abuse victim is addressed in Part III, infra.
103 Widiss, supra note 56, at 684-85.
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on their work lives. Antidiscrimination law is a critical piece of this
remedial mix both because it complements other available remedies and, as
a normative matter, because it is charged with reaching the full range of
discriminatory practices that perpetuate impermissible inequalities at work.
3. Workplace Responses
Over the last decade or so, employers have come to recognize the
widespread impact of domestic and sexual violence on the workplace. 0 4
The impact is both direct, as when the victim is harassed, threatened, or
attacked at work, and indirect, as through absenteeism and decreased
productivity of victims and perpetrators. 10 5 A growing consensus of
management and human resources experts urge employers to take a
proactive approach to the issue and to develop comprehensive policies, with
the goal of reducing the risk of workplace violence and retaining valued
employees. 106
Model policies have a dual focus on safety and productivity.
Experts encourage employers to provide information about domestic and
104 See, e.g., Corporate Alliance to End Partner Violence, CEO & Employee
Survey 2007: Corporate Leaders and America's Workforce on Domestic Violence,
http://www.caepv.org/about/program detail.php?reflD=34 (last visited Apr. 8, 2009) (a
significant majority of corporate executives and employees recognize the harmful and
extensive impact of domestic violence on the workplace, while recognizing many
employers' reticence to take action); Kelley Holland, Strife at Home Affects the Office, Too,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2007, at C17.
105 CDC I'VENTORY, supra note 56; accord Soc'Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., supra
note 71, at 5-6, 9-15; Lois G. REcKTT & LAURA A. FORTMAN, MAINE DEP'T OF LABOR,
IMPACT OF DOMESTIC OFFENDERS ON OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH: A PILOT STUDY
(2004), available at http://www.maine.gov/labor/labor-stats/publications/dvreports/domestic
offendersreport.pdf.
'06 See, e.g., CDC INVENTORY, supra note 56, at 1-5; Dougan & Wells, supra note
58, at 2; Stacey P. Dougan, Employers May Face Liability When Domestic Violence Comes
to Work, EMP. BENEFIT PLAN REv., Feb. 2003, at 3, available at
http://www2.gtlaw.com/pub/articles/2003/dougans03a.asp; Jane A. Randel & Kimberly K.
Wells, Corporate Approaches to Reducing Intimate Partner Violence Through Workplace
Initiatives, 3 CLINICAL OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED. 821, 824 (2003); Jennifer E.
Swanberg et al., Intimate Partner Violence, Employment, and the Workplace: Consequences
and Future Directions, 4 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE & ABUSE 21 (2005). In addition, see generally
Corporate Alliance to End Partner Violence, http://www.caepv.org (last visited Apr. 8,
2009); Family Violence Prevention Fund, Strategic Employer Responses to Domestic
Violence, http://www.endabuse.org/workplace (last visited Apr. 8, 2009); Legal Momentum,
Domestic and Sexual Violence Workplace Policies, http://www.legalmomentum.org/
site/DocServer/recommendedpolicyprovisions.pdf?doclD=521 (last visited Apr. 8, 2009).
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sexual violence resources in the community and to offer support to
employees who are victims, while maintaining policies that clearly prohibit
use of employer resources to commit acts of violence.10 7 This type of
comprehensive approach can reduce an employer's potential liability by
reducing the risk of violence occurring at work.108 Best practices for larger
employers include establishing a "multidisciplinary response team" with
representatives including senior management, human resources,
health/medical, legal, security, internal communications and media,
community, employee assistance programs, and unions. 10 9 Smaller
employers can develop analogous groups designated to respond to incidents
or threats of violence when they occur. 1 ° Experts emphasize that employee
benefits such as leave policies, flexible hours, and working shift
assignments should be administered flexibly to enable survivors to tend to
abuse-related legal, medical, and social service needs."' They recommend
training and awareness initiatives that alert employees about the nature of
the problem and the availability of resources for those affected by it. "12
An essential part of this approach is employers' role in encouraging
victims to seek help." 3 While employers cannot and should not take on the
role of counselor, they can make a critical difference for employees coping
with abuse by encouraging them to develop an individualized workplace
safety plan." 4 For domestic violence victims, safety planning is key to
seeking and maintaining safety. 1 5 In the workplace, this means evaluating
107 See, e.g., Dougan & Wells, supra note 58, at 3-4.
108 See, e.g., Dougan, supra note 106, at 3; CDC INVENTORY, supra note 56, at 1-7.
109 See, e.g., Dougan & Wells, supra note 58, at 2-3.
110 See, e.g., Family Violence Prevention Fund, Solutions for Small and Large
Employers: Safety and Security Concerns, http://endabuse.forumone.com/workplace/
display.php?DoclD=33008 (last visited Apr. 8, 2009).
111 See, e.g., Randel & Wells, supra note 106, at 826.
112 See, e.g., id. at 827-28.
113 See, e.g., id. at 828; Robertson, supra note 87, at 654.
114 Randel & Wells, supra note 106, at 828; Dougan & Wells, supra note 58, at 3.
115 See, e.g., Donna Mathews & Deborah M. Goelman, Safety Planning, in IMPACT
ON YOUR LEGAL PRACTICE, supra note 58, at 40; A.B.A. Comm'n on Domestic Violence,
Domestic Violence Safety Plan: Safety Tips for You and Your Family,
http://www.abanet.org/tips/publicservice/DVENG.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2009) (including
tips for safety planning at work).
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what steps may be needed to enhance a survivor's safety at work. A victim
is in the best position to assess when she is at risk and to identify the
strategies that will increase her safety and decrease the possibility of
abuse. 116
Safety planning entails conducting a risk assessment for each step
of a survivor's daily routines. With respect to the workplace, this can
include considerations such as: the need to change regular travel habits;
keeping emergency numbers and a copy of orders of protection, where
applicable, 117 on file at work; giving a copy of a picture of the abuser to
security and others at work; and evaluating whether other modifications,
such as changing work locations or phone numbers, would increase an
employee's safety. 118 For example, an employee who is continually
harassed by an abuser's phone calls can have her phone number changed.
Someone who needs time off from work to meet with her lawyer or a
domestic violence or sexual assault counselor may be able to keep her job if
she is afforded the time off. She may reduce the risk that an abuser will
commit an act of violence at work if she is able to register an order of
protection with security.1 19
However, all of these approaches are premised on the employee's
disclosure of the abuse to someone at work, presumably a person in a
position of some authority. 20 The decision to disclose any personal problem
to someone at work is difficult; the decision to disclose one's experience
with domestic or sexual violence is all the more complicated by fear of the
stigma that continues to be associated with the experience of abuse.' 2' At
least one recent study indicates that telling someone at work increases the
likelihood that a victim will be able to retain her job in the face of abuse. 122
116 Sally F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving Protection Orders for Domestic Violence: Can
Law Help End the Abuse Without Ending the Relationship?, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1487,
1541-42 (2008).
117 Id. at 1542.
118 See Dougan & Wells, supra note 58, at 6.
119 Only if she discloses the abuse can she work with other appropriate staff to
develop a workplace response strategy. See Dougan & Wells, supra note 58, at 2-3.
120 Id; see also Randel & Wells, supra note 106, at 828.
121 The role of silence and disclosure is discussed more fully in Part II.B.2., infra.
122 Jennifer Swanberg, Caroline Macke & T.K. Logan, Working Women Making It
Work: Intimate Partner Violence, Employment, and Workplace Support, 22 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 292, 305 (2007).
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The receipt of workplace support, such as schedule flexibility, phone call
screening, and employer assistance with a work-related safety plan, also has
been shown to increase women's chances of keeping their jobs in the face
of abuse.1 23 Nevertheless, current legal frameworks fail to incentivize
disclosure and offer no assurance that a woman will be immune from
retaliation if she does disclose her experience with abuse.
II. GENDER VIOLENCE AND WORK: ANTIDISCRIMINATION
LAWS' REACH AND LIMITS
As one commentator recently noted, common sense would dictate
that when an employee is terminated because she is a victim of domestic
violence, that termination would be seen as impermissibly discriminatory.124
In some cases, discrimination against a domestic or sexual violence victim
can form the basis for a relatively straightforward claim of sex
discrimination. 12 However, antidiscrimination laws operate to preclude
claims by domestic and sexual violence victims whose experiences do not
fit prescribed circumstances.
Notwithstanding the documented ways in which domestic and
sexual violence survivors lose their jobs in the aftermath of abuse,' 26
notably few lawsuits have asserted employment discrimination claims on
their behalf. This may be explained by a combination of factors, such as
victims' reluctance to self-identify; their lack of understanding that their
employment rights may have been violated; and lawyers' failure to
recognize that a domestic violence victim may have suffered employment
discrimination based on her sex. Her counsel may correctly determine that
antidiscrimination law as it is presently applied would not cover her claim.
The failure explicitly to recognize the insidious role sex discrimination
plays in these cases is particularly troubling given: 1) the persistence of sex-
based differentials in pay and position notwithstanding antidiscrimination
laws; 2) the invisibility of the connections between domestic and sexual
violence and sex discrimination; 3) domestic and sexual violence victims'
continuing reluctance to disclose that they have suffered abuse; and 4) the
mounting documentation that the predominantly female victims of domestic
and sexual violence lose their jobs, at least in part, due to the abuse.
123 Id. at 304, 306.
124 See Porter, supra note 59, at 292.
125 See infra Part II.A.
126 See supra Part I.B. 1.
[Vol. 1 8:1
Gender Violence and Work
These considerations raise the question of whether
antidiscrimination law accurately captures the discriminatory workplace
harms of domestic and sexual violence. The following discussion describes
the categories of cases that fit comfortably in current antidiscrimination
models, as well as those that do not. It then argues that the cases that fall
outside traditional frameworks often reflect the operation of subtle biases
and invisible stereotypes, which antidiscrimination law can and should
address.
A. Covered Cases
It will be no surprise that several categories of cases in which
domestic or sexual violence victims are subjected to adverse employment
actions may be actionable under federal or state antidiscrimination laws.
This section will review how disparate treatment, disparate impact, and
sexual harassment theories currently apply to those circumstances.
1. Similarly Situated Employees
The hallmark of disparate treatment claims is proof that an
employee suffered an adverse job action because of her membership in a
protected class. 127 Without statutory employment protection for domestic or
sexual violence victims, 128 a domestic or sexual violence victim's most
likely claim (absent evidence of discrimination based on race, religion, or
another protected category) would be that by virtue of suffering an adverse
action due to her status as a domestic or sexual violence victim, she suffered
discrimination based on sex.
In some cases, a domestic violence victim may be able to establish
that she suffered disparate treatment through comparator evidence showing
that a female victim of domestic violence was treated differently than a
similarly situated male. This will most frequently arise in cases in which
both the perpetrator and victim work for the same employer, where the
127 See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2009)
(prohibiting unlawful employment practices "because of" an individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin). For a discussion of the frameworks used to establish
disparate treatment claims, see, e.g., LEx LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 8 (2008).
128 See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text (discussing reform at the state
level).
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employer knows of the abuse and nevertheless penalizes the victim
(typically the woman) but not the perpetrator.1 29
For example, in Rohde v. K.O. Steel Castings, Inc.,' 30 Rohde, a
secretary who had worked for K.O. Castings for six years, was involved
with Arnulfo Lopez, a cleaning room foreman at the same company.
Company officials were aware of their relationship. 13' At some point, Lopez
became abusive towards Rohde. Rohde told the company's personnel
director of two incidents in which Lopez assaulted her, and the director
allowed her to take time off (counting against her vacation time).1 32
However, when the company president and vice president learned of
Rohde's absence, she was terminated. 33 In upholding her disparate
treatment claim, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded:
Where two employees were engaged in an altercation and the
aggressor went unpunished while the victim, a member of a
minority protected by the Act, bore the full brunt of retribution, it
is clear to us that Congress intended a cause of action to lie in the
absence of a sufficient explanation of nondiscriminatory reasons
for the disparity. We are unable to discern such an explanation, as
was the district court, and its judgment must be affirmed. 134
Other plaintiffs have presented similar facts, but their cases were
resolved before a final ruling on their disparate treatment claims. 35
129 As Porter recognizes, disparate treatment theory might also apply when a
battered woman seeks a benefit given to the men in the workplace. Porter, supra note 59, at
293. However, I have yet to encounter a case involving these facts.
130 649 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1981). Others have noted the applicability of this case.
See, e.g., Porter, supra note 59, at 293; Tarr, supra note 23, at 393; Widiss, supra note 56, at
684 n.42.
131 Rohde, 649 F.2d at 319.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 323.
135 See, e.g., Valdez v. Truss Components, No. CV98-1310-RE, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22957 (D. Or. Aug. 15, 1999) (rejecting employer argument that plaintiff was an
independent contractor not covered by Title VII but rejecting wrongful discharge claim); see
also cases discussed in Weiser & Widiss, supra note 87, at 5-6. Other cases brought under
Title VII have resulted in jury awards but no written decisions. See, e.g., Complaint, Steele
v. Snowline Mfg., Inc., No. 06CV0555-MA (Deschutes, Or., Dec. 13, 2007) (on file with
author) (alleging, inter alia, gender discrimination when a female employee was fired after
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Notwithstanding the evolution of disparate treatment doctrine since the
1981 Rohde decision, 136 its central holding-that adverse action against the
victim of aggression who is a member of a protected class constitutes
impermissible discrimination-stands as good law. 137
2. Recognized Sex-Based Stereotypes
Disparate treatment claims also may be based on evidence that
adverse actions were rooted in outdated sex-based stereotypes.138 For
example, an employer may assert that a victim of domestic or sexual
violence "deserved it," that she is unsuited for employment because she"allowed" herself to be abused or that, if she wasn't strong enough to
handle her home life, she would not be strong enough to perform a
particular job satisfactorily. 139 Alternatively, an employer might deny a job
filing a protective order to keep her abusive coworker from coming to the workplace),
reviewed in 10 A.B.A. COMM'N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE E-NEWSLETTER (2008), available at
http://www.abanet.org/domviol/enewsletter/vol I 0/cases.html (describing jury award).
136 For discussion of the evolution of disparate treatment doctrine, see Martin J.
Katz, Unifying Disparate Treatment (Really), 59 HASTINGS L.J. 643 (2008).
137 The Rohde case was not analyzed under the burden-shifting framework for
proving a Title VII violation. Under that framework, an employee first would have to
establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment by showing that: 1) she is a member of a
protected class (women); 2) that she was qualified for her position; 3) that she suffered an
adverse employment action; and 4) that the circumstances give rise to an inference of
discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1972). The burden
of production then shifts to the employer to prove a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for
the adverse action. The employee then has the burden of proving that the employer's stated
reason was a pretext for impermissible discrimination. Texas Dep't of Cmty. Aff. v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248 (1981). If her employer had been able to establish a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for her termination, such as performance problems, Rohde still
might have established that this reason was a pretext for discrimination. Terminating a
female victim of abuse while not disciplining a male perpetrator may evince discrimination,
particularly if her performance issues were no worse than those of her abusive coworker.
Alternatively, such an argument might be analyzed under a mixed motive theory.
138 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (plurality opinion).
139 See, e.g., Eileen Kwesiga et al., Exploring the Literature on Relationships
Between Gender Roles, Intimate Partner Violence, Occupational Status, and Organizational
Benefits, 22 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 312, 317-21 (2007) (linking gendered stigma
associated with domestic violence with women's decisions whether to access benefits at
work); Swanberg & Logan, supra note 67, at 11-12 (finding that women did not disclose the
abuse to someone at work due to fear of job loss, shame about their situation, and a sense
that they "should" be able to handle the situation independently).
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or promotion to a sexual assault victim based, for example, on stereotypes
that she "asked for it" and consequently could not be counted on to act
appropriately in a particular position. In cases involving evidence of those
or other sex-based stereotypes, plaintiffs should prevail under established
doctrine.1 40 This is not unlike the ways that adverse employment actions
taken against caregivers may constitute disparate treatment in violation of
Title VII. 141 Nevertheless, current interpretations may miss the subtle
operation of bias, thus omitting cases that nevertheless reflect gendered
stereotypes. 42
3. Identifiable Policies Against Domestic or Sexual Violence Victims
Domestic or sexual violence victims also may assert that an adverse
employment action taken against them because of their experience with
abuse violates antidiscrimination prohibitions because the actions reflect a
policy that, while facially gender-neutral, has a disparate impact based on
sex. 143 If an employee can establish such a policy, she need not prove
discriminatory intent or motive. 44 Certainly, it is not difficult to establish
that domestic and sexual violence have a disparate impact based on the
victim's sex. 145 Consequently, if an employer maintained a policy
authorizing adverse actions against domestic or sexual violence victims,
whether framed as a domestic or sexual violence policy or as an application
of a workplace violence policy, it might impermissibly discriminate based
on sex.
140 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258.
141 See, e.g., JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER 101-10 (2000); EEOC,
Enforcement Guidance: Unlawful Disparate Treatment of Workers with Caregiving
Responsibilities (May 23, 2007), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiving.html; Eyal
Press, Family-Leave Values, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 29, 2007, at 37 (reviewing developing
recognition that discrimination against caregivers violates antidiscrimination laws).
142 See infra Parts II.B. 1-3.
143 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). Generally, to establish a
Title VII disparate impact claim, a plaintiff would have to prove: 1) a particular employment
practice; 2) that causes a disparate impact; 3) based on a protected characteristic. See Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i) (2009). An employer
then can rebut the employee's prima facie case by establishing that the policy nevertheless
was "job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity." Id.
'44 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
145 See supra note 11 (citing statistics).
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Analogous arguments have proved successful against landlords
when domestic violence victims lose housing based on policies
disadvantaging domestic violence victims. 146 Similar arguments should
apply to the workplace in cases in which an employment policy with
punitive effects toward domestic violence victims can be shown. 147
However, the realities of employment, as opposed to housing, may explain
why fewer such cases have been brought involving work. Notwithstanding
the widespread and severe impact of domestic and sexual violence in the
workplace, it will be more commonplace and more visible in the home.
Landlords and public housing authorities had developed explicit policies,
nominally aimed at violence prevention and maintaining safe residences,
which require victims of abuse to be evicted.148 In many cases, those formal
policies have now been struck down, based on determinations that they
discriminate based on sex.149
Despite the technical availability of disparate impact claims in
workplace cases, several factors render such claims more difficult to
sustain. First, employers are unlikely to maintain explicit policies
mandating termination (the employment equivalent of eviction) or other
adverse action against domestic violence victims. This may stem in part
from employers' limited recognition of the scope of the impact of domestic
146 See, e.g., Bouley v. Young-Sabourin, 394 F. Supp. 2d 675 (D. Vt. 2005)
(upholding sex discrimination claim under Fair Housing Act when landlord sought to evict
domestic violence victim less than 72 hours after her husband assaulted her); Alvera v.
Creekside Village Apts., HUD ALJ No. 10-99-0538-8 (U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev.,
Portland, Or. Apr. 13, 2001) (policy discriminating against domestic violence victims
violates prohibitions on sex discrimination); see also, e.g., Emily J. Martin, Fair Housing for
Battered Women: Preventing Homelessness Through Civil Rights Laws, 27 CORNERSTONE 11
(2006), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/fairhousingforbatteredwomen072806.pdf
(discussing theories and citing cases); Weiser & Widiss, supra note 87, at 6-7 (same); 42
U.S.C. §1437f(c)(9) (2009) (providing, inter alia, that applicants for Section 8 housing
vouchers cannot be denied housing because of their experiences with domestic violence, and
that an abuser's actual or threatened violence cannot be the basis for adverse decisions
regarding the victim's housing); U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEv., PUBLIC HOUSING
OCCUPANCY GUIDEBOOK 216-19 (2003) [hereinafter HUD] (recommending preferences for
domestic violence victims and discussing best practices for maintaining victims' housing
status); see generally Lenora M. Lapidus, Doubly Victimized: Housing Discrimination
Against Victims of Domestic Violence, 1I AM. U.J. GENDER, SOC. POL'Y & L. 377 (2003).
147 See Calaf, supra note 65, at 186-91; Matejkovic, supra note 85, at 336; Porter,
supra note 59, at 294-95; Tarr, supra note 23, at 393-94; Weiser & Widiss, supra note 87, at
6-7.
148 See, e.g., Martin, supra note 146, at 6; HUD, supra note 146.
149 Martin, supra note 146, at 6.
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and sexual violence on the workplace. It may also reflect an employer's
correct and laudable recognition that termination is not always necessary or
proper. Either way, in the absence of a stated policy to terminate or
otherwise disadvantage domestic or sexual violence victims, a plaintiff
would have to establish that an adverse action taken against her
nevertheless reflected an actionable employment practice.1 50 Although at
least one court has recognized that a single decision by an employer
qualifies as an actionable employment practice, others indicate that an
employment decision that can be shown to have affected only one employee
falls outside the reach of a disparate impact claim. 5 ' A plaintiff likely
would have to establish that an employer would also treat another domestic
violence victim adversely. It may be difficult for a victim to obtain that type
of information, particularly given victims' reluctance to self-identify and
disclose their status to others in the workplace,1 52 and an employer's easy
and plausible defense that it was an employee's unique circumstances,
rather than a policy against domestic or sexual violence victims, that
underlay its decision.
Moreover, a plaintiff may have difficulty establishing the requisite
statistical impact. Disparate impact theory arose, and is most often used, in
the context of exclusionary hiring practices.' 53 Accordingly, courts
generally look to a comparison of the percentage of employees in the
protected class in the workplace under the challenged policy with the
percentage of qualified individuals in the relevant population pool. 15 4 With
an employment (as opposed to hiring) practice, the comparison would work
somewhat differently. Here, a court might compare the percentage of
IS0 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i)
(2009). A plaintiff might also sustain a claim if she could establish that a (gender neutral)
workplace violence policy was applied in a way that disadvantaged domestic or sexual
violence victims. I have not identified any such case to date.
151 Compare, e.g., Council 31, AFSCME v. Ward, 978 F.2d 373, 378 (7th Cir.
1992) (upholding disparate impact claim based on single employer action), with Bramble v.
Am. Postal Workers Union, 135 F.3d 21, 26 (1 st Cir. 1998) (rejecting disparate impact claim
based on evidence that pay decision to date had only affected one employee).
152 See Swanberg & Logan, supra note 67, at 11-12.
153 Calaf, supra note 65, at 187; see also, Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate
Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REv. 701, 707, 733-53 (arguing that disparate
impact theory has not been successful outside of cases challenging employment tests).
' See, e.g., LEX LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 22.02 (2007).
However, not all courts have required comparator evidence. See infra note 155.
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employees in a protected group who would be affected by the policy with
the percentage of employees in the general workplace. Calaf is correct that
generally, this would lead to a conclusion that a policy adversely affecting
domestic or sexual violence victims would disproportionately affect women
given that women are disproportionately victims of domestic and sexual
violence. 155 However, as Porter and Tarr note, at least some courts have
required evidence that the policy disproportionately affected members of a
protected class in the plaintiffs workplace; in other words, proof of general
statistical disparity would not suffice. 156 Nevertheless, not all courts have
required proof that a neutral policy disproportionately impacted the
protected group in a particular workplace. 157 Although I do not agree with
Porter that the question of the appropriate comparison data is settled and
that a disparate impact theory categorically is unavailable absent a
particularized showing in a given workplace, she is correct that
commentators such as Calaf have glossed over this distinction recognized
by some courts and accordingly may have overstated the availability of the
theory. 158
4. Sexual Harassment
The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that sexual
harassment and sexual violence constitute forms of sex discrimination
under Title VII. Sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII and
analogous state antidiscrimination laws either when the employer
conditions employment on sexual favors or where the abuse creates a
155 Calaf, supra note 65 at 187.
156 Porter, supra note 59, at 294-95 (citing, inter alia, analogous cases); Tarr, supra
note 23, at 393-94; accord, Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race and Equal
Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1034 (1986) (criticizing disparate impact theory for
challenging only policies within a particular employer's workplace over a limited time
period).
157 Some courts have refused to require a workplace-specific showing. See, e.g.,
Bradley v. Pizzaco, 939 F.2d 610, 612-13 (8th Cir. 1991) (upholding disparate impact claim
based on no-beard policy, relying on studies and expert testimony that such a policy
discriminates against black males, who disproportionately suffer from a skin disorder
brought on by shaving); accord Abraham v. Graphic Arts Int'l Union, 660 F.2d 811, 819
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (upholding disparate impact claim concerning pregnancy-related leave
without analysis of statistical impact in plaintiff's workplace).
158 The difficulties in establishing disparate impact liability in this seemingly
appropriate context raise questions whether the doctrine needs revisiting overall. However,
such questions are beyond this Article's scope.
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hostile environment. 159 The landmark case, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,
was a case of repeated sexual assault. 160 The Supreme Court concluded
without dissent that "[w]ithout question, when a supervisor sexually
harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor
"discriminate[s] on the basis of sex." 161 The Court easily accepted that
forcing employees to "run a gauntlet of sexual abuse" as a condition of
employment constituted sex discrimination that violated Title VII.
162
Although commentators have rightly criticized the Court's easy equation of
sexual harassment with sex discrimination for inadequately theorizing the
ways in which sexual violence constitutes sex discrimination, 163 the Court's
recognition of the connection paved the way for lower courts to treat at least
some workplace manifestations of sexual violence as sex discrimination.
Accordingly, rape or sexual assault in the workplace may violate
antidiscrimination laws.' 64 The employer may be liable if the abuse is
committed by a supervisor or other agent,165 by a coworker, or by a non-
employee such as a customer, provided that the harassment involved the
workplace and that the employer knew or should have known of the abuse
and failed to take prompt and appropriate remedial action.166 Because
159 See Faraghar v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751-66 (1998) (articulating standards for employer liability in sexual
harassment claims).
16' 477 U.S. 57, 60 (1986).
161 Id. at 64.
162 Id.
163 See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 1169, 1173-88 (1998); Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual
Harassment, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691, 729-62 (1997); Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual
Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1692-1713 (1998).
164 See, e.g., Meritor, 477 U.S. at 57, 66 (supervisor sexually assaulted employee).
Sexual assault is also actionable in schools. See Doe v. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 19, 66 F.
Supp. 2d 57, 62 (D. Me. 1999) (sexual assault of student by high school teacher).
165 See, e.g., Smith v. Sheahan, 189 F.3d 529, 533-34 (7th Cir. 1999) (single
incident of sexual assault would be enough to establish claim); Brock v. United States, 64
F.3d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that "every rape committed in the employment
setting is also discrimination based on the employee's sex"); Jones v. United States Gypsum,
No. C99-3047-MWB, 2000 WL 196616 (N.D. Iowa Jan 21, 2000) (upholding sexual
harassment claim based on assault in genital area, and citing cases).
166 See, e.g., Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d 958, 964, 968 (9th
Cir. 2002) (stating that an employer may be liable for harassment by failing to act after one
[Vol. 18:1
Gender Violence and Work
sexual harassment laws apply regardless of the personal relationship
between the harasser and victim, employers may be liable for sexual
harassment when anyone abuses an intimate partner at work, provided the
abuse otherwise meets the requirements for a sexual harassment claim.'
67
For example, in Excel Corp. v. Bosley, the Eighth Circuit upheld
the sexual harassment claim of Kristine Bosley, whose harassment by her
ex-husband and coworker Rock Johnson created a hostile environment at
the meat-packing plant at which they both worked. 68 Johnson repeatedly
harassed Bosley by calling her names such as "bitch," "slut" or "whore."'
69
He threatened to kill one of Bosley's friends and her future husband, and
violated work rules by throwing meat and animal organs at her.170 Bosley
repeatedly reported the harassment to management, whose initial response
of its employees reported being raped by a client); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010,
1012, 1014-16 (8th Cir. 1988) (stating that sexual harassment laws applied where female
employees were subjected to unwanted touching and offensive comments by coworkers);
Menchaca v. Rose Records, Inc., No. 94-C-1376, 1995 WL 151847, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 3,
1995) (stating that an employer is not shielded from liability where the harasser is a customer
if he "knew or should have known of the harassment"); Otis v. Wyse, No. 93-2349-KHV,
1994 WL 566943, at *6 (D. Kan. Aug. 24, 1994) (stating that an employer may be
responsible for alleged harassment by an independent contractor); Hernandez v. Miranda-
Velez, No. 92-2701, 1994 WL 394855, at *6 (D.P.R. July 20, 1994) (acknowledging
potential employer liability for sexual harassment by one of its clients); Powell v. Las Vegas
Hilton Corp., 841 F. Supp. 1024, 1028 (D. Nev. 1992) (stating that a hotel employer could be
held liable for the sexual harassment of employees by customer); see also 29 C.F.R. §
1604.1 1(d)-(e) (2006) (EEOC guidelines confirming employers' liability for sexual
harassment by coworkers and customers). But see, e.g., Lapka v. Chertoff, 517 F.3d 974 (7th
Cir. 2008) (rejecting sexual harassment claim based on sexual assault and subsequent
workplace visits by co-worker when employer initiated investigation).
167 For example, the First Circuit recently recognized that an employee's former
partner harassed her "based on her sex," even though it rejected her claim after concluding
that the employers' response was prompt and appropriate. Forrest v. Brinker Int'l Payroll
Co., No. 07-1714, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 29300 (1st Cir. Dec. 19, 2007). The court
reasoned that "[w]hether a harasser picks his or her targets because of a prior intimate
relationship, desire for a future intimate relationship, or any other factor,... should not be
the focus of the Title VII analysis." Id. at * 10. It correctly concluded that the focus instead
should be on whether gender bias can be inferred from conduct. Id. at *10. See also, e.g.,
Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1525-27, 1529 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding city liable
for failing to take steps to stop a police officer from harassing another officer after she ended
their relationship).
168 165 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 1999).
169 Id. at 638.
170 Id.
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was to tell both Bosley and Johnson to "keep their disputes at home.' 7 '
Bosley took personal leave due to the stress, but when she returned to work,
Johnson continued to harass her. 172 Bosley asked for temporary relief from
her workstation to get away from Johnson's harassment; Bosley's
supervisor twice refused her requests despite knowledge of Johnson's
harassment. 173 Bosley became frustrated, pushed Johnson in the chest, and
told him to get out of the area and go back to his assigned post.174 Bosley's
supervisor placed her on "indefinite suspension" for violating a work rule
prohibiting physical contact between employees. 175 As Bosley was leaving
the work area, she saw Johnson in another room. 176 She pushed past a
supervisor to enter the room in which she saw Johnson.177 Her employer
terminated Bosley, but did not sanction Johnson for his role in any of those
events. 178
The court upheld Bosley's sexual harassment claim. 179 It found
sufficient evidence to support the jury's conclusion that Bosley had been
subjected to a hostile work environment; Excel did not appeal that
finding. 80 The court concluded that the termination process was tainted by
sex discrimination based on management's refusal to act to stop the









179 Bosley apparently did not appeal the court's rejection of her disparate treatment
claim, and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals does not detail the trial court's reasoning.
Excel Corp. v. Bosley, 165 F.3d 635, 638 (8th Cir. 1999).
180 Id. at 639.
181 Id
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the court found that this case fit readily into the familiar framework for
analyzing sexual harassment claims. 182
B. Excluded Cases
Notwithstanding the apparent applicability of antidiscrimination
law to some cases involving domestic or sexual violence victims, many
cases fall outside of antidiscrimination laws' comfortable reach. The
dynamics of abuse, infused with the legacy of historic gender biases,
operate to render the role of abuse invisible, creating a dynamic that
perpetuates sex-based inequality.
1. Invisible Stereotypes
Despite decades of reform, domestic and sexual violence victims
continue to be subjected to historic, sex-based stereotypes. These
stereotypes are well described in the literature, as are their links to the
formal and informal legal and cultural norms sanctioning male violence
against women.1 83 My purpose here is to highlight common ways in which
182 The concurring opinion of Judge Loken, which expresses concern about
"marital spat[s]" that "spill... over into the workplace," is discussed infra notes 222-24 and
accompanying text.
183 For discussions of common stereotypes associated with domestic violence, see
SCHNEIDER, supra note 44, at 62, 75, 80 (discussing stereotypes of helplessness, passivity,
and purity); Lenore Walker, How Battering Happens and How to Stop It, in BATTERED
WOMEN 59 (Donna M. Moore ed. 1979) (describing the response to battering as "learned
helplessness" that renders domestic violence victims unable to leave); Naomi Cahn & Joan
Meier, Domestic Violence and Feminist Jurisprudence: Towards a New Agenda, 4 B.U. PUB.
INT. L.J. 339, 353-55 (1995) (describing pedagogical approaches to dispel the common
stereotypes of domestic violence victims as weak, passive, and pathological for "staying"
with abuser); Mahoney, supra note 63, at 24-26 (describing stereotypes). For discussions of
the somewhat different stereotypes associated with sexual assault, see Michelle J. Anderson,
From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License: Sexual Consent and a New Rape Shield
Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 54, 64-69 (2002); Kimberl Crenshaw, Mapping the
Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43
STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1266-67 (1991) (describing stereotype of "innocent" victims of rape as
opposed to women who "got what they were asking for"). See generally PEGGY R. SANDAY,
A WOMAN SCORNED: ACQUAINTANCE RAPE ON TRIAL (1996). For discussions of the ways
these stereotypes are racially skewed, see Sharon A. Allard, Rethinking Battered Woman
Syndrome: A Black Feminist Perspective, I UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 191 (1991) (critiquing the
"battered woman syndrome" based on Lenore Walker's "learned helplessness" as consistent
with stereotypes of white, not African-American, women); Linda L. Ammons, Mules,
Madonnas, Babies, Bathwater, Racial Imagery and Stereotypes: The African-American
Woman and the Battered Woman Syndrome, 1995 WIs. L. REV. 1003; Crenshaw, supra, at
1266-68 (describing racial and gendered stereotypes that inform popular conceptions of
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those stereotypes invisibly impact survivors' work experiences, rather than
to describe the stereotypes in detail. The stereotypes ascribed to domestic
and sexual violence victims are somewhat in tension, with domestic
violence victims often cast as weak and passive, and rape victims generally
seen as deviant, sexual, and provocative. Nevertheless, there are
commonalities. For example, stereotypes operate to lay blame for the abuse
on both groups of victims (to the extent they are distinct groups). They
cause victims to experience shame and stigma that leave them reluctant to
disclose the abuse to family, friends, law enforcement, and other
community members, including employers. Both the stereotypes
themselves, and the fear of being the target of stereotypes, produce silence
and shame that operate to disadvantage women at work.
In focusing on the subtle ways in which sex-based biases and
stereotypes impact survivors' employment, this Article does not contend
that actionable stereotypes operate in every case involving domestic or
sexual violence or that every case in which a victim-blaming stereotype
operates should give rise to an actionable Title VII violation. Instead, it
describes a structural dynamic that illustrates the subtle operation of bias
and that often skews domestic and sexual violence survivors' treatment at
work.
a. Victim-blaming
Although the specific expression of the stereotype may vary,
domestic violence victims often are blamed for the abuse they
experience. 184 Employers may inadvertently base employment decisions on
a judgment that a woman poses a risk to the workplace due to her partner's
violence, as though she were accountable for or could control his abuse.
A recent decision by the Seventh Circuit illustrates how the
stereotype operates. In Hossack v. Floor Covering Associates, the court
upheld the termination of an exemplary female employee because of her
husband's threats and abuse after he learned of her affair with a
coworker.18 5 The court rejected her argument that she was similarly situated
rape); Zanita E. Fenton, Domestic Violence in Black and White: Racialized Gender
Stereotypes in Gender Violence, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1998); Paula R. Gilbert,
Discourses of Female Violence and Societal Gender Stereotypes, 8 VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN 1271 (2002) (discussing gender stereotypes and violent women).
184 Researchers have posited that stigma surrounding abuse negatively impacts
women's willingness to access benefits and policies, even when they are available. See
Kwesiga et. al., supra note 139.
185 492 F.3d 853, 856 (7th Cir. 2007).
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to the (male) employee with whom she was involved for several reasons.
First, management feared that "her husband might very well cause
workplace disruption."' 86 In addition, the employee with whom she had the
affair was "the top salesman and producer" at the store in which they
worked. 187 After noting that the employer did not discipline either employee
for having an affair, the court concluded that she would be similarly
situated "only to other employees who threatened to cause workplace
disruption."'188 It therefore rejected her efforts to establish a prima facie case
of sex discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework.' 89
The court went on to evaluate whether she could present direct or
circumstantial evidence of bias. After the trial court found in Hossack's
favor and awarded her $250,000, the Seventh Circuit inquired whether she
had produced "sufficient evidence for a rational jury to conclude that she
was discriminated against and discharged because she is a woman."1 90 The
court reversed the jury verdict, finding that Hossack did not produce
sufficient evidence of intentional discrimination. Even though the company
did not dispute that Hossack's work record was exemplary, and that she was
terminated because management feared her husband's violence, the court
upheld her termination because the male employee with whom she had the
affair was the store's top salesman, and thus, was "more important to the
organization."' 91
This case reflects several dimensions of bias. The fact that the male
employee was retained due to his superior revenue-producing position may
reflect historic, gender-based pay differentials. It essentially solidifies the
statistical probability that men work in higher earning positions.,9 2 It
perpetuates men's job security at women's expense, even when the woman
186 Id. at 861.
187 id.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 860. The court analyzed her claim as a mixed motive claim; however, it
evaluated whether she had established a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas in order
to determine whether she could establish a sex discrimination claim based on the "indirect
method" of proof established by McDonnell Douglas. Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973)).
190 Id. at 862.
191 Id. at 863.
192 See supra note 2 (citing statistics).
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was a top performer in her, albeit lower revenue-generating position. But
even more troubling for the purposes of this Article is the fact that the court
allowed the employee to be terminated based on her husband's threatening
abusive behavior. The court thus equated Hossack with her husband, and
held her directly accountable for her husband's threats. The court's
treatment of Hossack's husband's actions as her own harkens back to
coverture, when a husband and wife were treated as one legal person. 193
Moreover, the court blames the victim, jeopardizing the innocent party's
employment status for conduct over which she has no control.' 94
The implications of this decision are limited in several respects.
First, the opinion does not reveal whether Hossack's husband's abusive
behavior extended beyond the threats he made to her coworker. In addition,
the employer here, and other employers in similar circumstances may have
had legitimate concerns about workplace safety that may, in some cases,
warrant altering the conditions of a victim's employment. However, the
reflexive termination of the female employee, without consideration of less
onerous alternatives that would address any safety concerns without
jeopardizing her employment, is both unnecessary and problematic. By
failing to acknowledge that she should not be held accountable for her
husband's threats, never mind that she may be the victim of his threats as
well, the court perpetuates a common sex-based stereotype and contributes
to a woman's economic disadvantage.
Other cases similarly illustrate employers' reflexive overreaction to
an employee's abusive partner at the expense of the female employee's job.
Philloria Green's employer terminated her-allegedly due to workplace
safety concerns-after she reported that she was raped and beaten by her
estranged husband. 195  The employer's concern may have been
understandable, given its obligation to take reasonable steps to safeguard
193 See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *430-32 (setting forth
system of coverture); SCHNEIDER, supra note 44, at 13-14; Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of
Love ": Wife Beating as Prerogative, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2122 (1996).
194 See e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Civil Rights Legislation in the 1990s: Three Civil
Rights Fallacies, 79 CAL. L. REv. 751, 759-60 (1991) (discussing victim-blaming). See
generally WILLIAM RYAN, BLAMING THE VICTIM (1976). Although Ryan's critique that the
oppressed are blamed for conditions of which they are in fact victims originated in the
context of race and poverty, it applies as well to popular attitudes towards subordination of
women, including abuse. See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 63, at 26-27 (describing the victim-
blaming mentality applied to battered women); Miccio, supra note 44, at 255 (describing
how women have been blamed for their own victimization).
195 Green v. Bryant, 887 F. Supp. 798, 800 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1995). Ms. Green did not
argue that the termination violated antidiscrimination laws.
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the workplace from known threats.196 However, nothing in the decision
indicates that her former partner threatened the workplace, or that her
removal would remove the safety threat. This is another case in which the
reflexive termination of the (female) victim of abuse has the effect of
punishing the victim without ascertaining whether it in fact would render
the workplace any safer.
Other examples illustrate that employers' actions may be based on
well-meaning efforts to promote workplace safety but may nevertheless
excessively discipline the (usually female) victim. For example, a childcare
worker alleged that she was fired after telling management that she had an
order of protection against her ex-husband. 97 The woman allegedly told
security that her ex-husband had called her at work despite a restraining
order prohibiting him from doing so. She alleged she was terminated
because management was "unsure the campus was safe."' 198 Although an
employer should take steps to enhance the safety of the workplace,
removing the worker who is the survivor of violence as an initial matter is
not the best approach. 199 Removing the worker will not necessarily remove
the risk of violence, since her abusive partner could still show up at the
workplace and commit an act of violence regardless of whether she still
worked there. Accordingly, the response may not be an appropriately
calibrated remedy to the perceived problem.
The overuse of discipline against domestic or sexual violence
victims should raise a red flag about whether the action was motivated, at
least in part, by sex-based bias. A similar threat of violence by a stranger to
the workplace likely would not lead an employer to terminate the employee
who received the threat. 200 Even in a hypothetical case in which an
employee knew the person issuing the threat (but was not involved in an
intimate abusive relationship with him or her), one would expect the
employer to inquire or otherwise engage with the employee about the best
196 Green, 887 F. Supp. at 800. For a description of employers' obligations under
tort law, see supra note 88 and accompanying text.
197 Family Violence Prevention Fund, supra note 110 (citing Day care worker sues
over firing, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Sept. 3, 2004, at 26).
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 As the Family Violence Prevention Fund materials point out, if a customer
obsessed with a sales clerk in a retail business repeatedly threatens the sales clerk,
terminating the clerk would not be the appropriate approach to addressing the risk. Family
Violence Prevention Fund, supra note 1 10.
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way to reduce the risk of violence at work. Responses far less intrusive than
termination, such as changing an employee's telephone number, or
assigning someone to screen calls, may be more closely tailored to
addressing the problem. Termination of a domestic violence victim under
these circumstances conjures inaccurate sex-based stereotypes that a woman
is able to control her abuser's violence, views that may be traced to legal
approval of male violence against their partners. 20 1 Alternatively, reflexive
termination of the female employee, as a way of "eliminating" the problem,
evokes the historic attitude that domestic violence is a private matter that
should not be addressed in the public sphere of employment.20 2
b. Misconceptions
In other cases, employers' misunderstandings about the nature of
abuse disadvantage women's employment. For example, a variation of the
victim-blaming stereotype manifests in assumptions that if the victim leaves
an abusive relationship the problem will be solved.20 3 Consequently, a
survivor may fear that she will be treated differently at work if coworkers
find out. Part of this fear may be a concern that she will be blamed for
staying in the relationship.20 4 In addition, she may be held accountable for
the violence if she does not leave. An employer may make an employee's
continued employment contingent on her leaving her abuser. This reflects
an inaccurate understanding of the nature of abuse, since separation often
increases, rather than decreases, the risk of further abuse. 20 5 Nor is this
misconception benign, as it blames the victim and may put her at risk of
further violence.
201 Current views of domestic violence victims as responsible for or able to control
the abuse may be rooted in historic depictions of domestic violence as caused by women
victims. See GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 46, at 52 (describing psychological theories
explaining battering, for example, by women's provocation of the violence).
202 See, e.g., id. at 29-30; SCHNEIDER, supra note 44, at 13-20.
203 This assumption has been criticized as negatively affecting the treatment of
domestic violence victims in a wide range of contexts. See Goldfarb, supra note 116; see
also, e.g., SCHNEIDER, supra note 44, at 77-79.
204 Robin R. Runge, Employer Liability and Domestic Violence Victim Advocacy,
in IMPACT ON YOUR LEGAL PRACTICE, supra note 58, at 376, 377.
205 See, e.g., GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 46, at 76, 98; Mahoney, supra note
63, at 64-65; Margo Wilson & Martin Daly, Spousal Homicide Risk and Estrangement, 8
VIOLENCE AND VICTIMS 3 (1993) (correlating elevated risk of homicide with separation);
Goldfarb, supra note 116, at 1520.
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In another variation of the ways subtle biases about abuse impact
women's employment, courts may misinterpret a victim's actions and
ignore the realities of abuse. For example, in RAP, Inc. v. District of
Columbia Commission on Human Rights, Seneta Rose, who worked at a
private nonprofit organization with her husband, Greg, was terminated after
she and her husband had a heated argument at work.2 °6 Their dispute
escalated to the point where Mr. Rose shoved Ms. Rose and knocked her to
the ground, upon which Ms. Rose drew a knife from her purse and swung it
at her husband.20 7 After investigating the dispute, RAP, Inc., their employer,
discharged Ms. Rose and reprimanded Mr. Rose.20 8 It justified its disparate
treatment by the fact that she had used a dangerous weapon, whereas he had
not.2°9 The District of Columbia Commission on Human Rights agreed with
Ms. Rose that the disparate treatment was discriminatory, since the two
employees were similarly situated.210 However, the Court of Appeals
reversed its findings, and concluded that there was insufficient evidence of
discrimination. 211 The appellate court rejected the Commission's conclusion
that Ms. Rose used the knife in self defense, and upheld the disparate
treatment of these two employees on the basis that Ms. Rose used a knife,
212and Mr. Rose had not. The court ignored the fact that Mr. Rose
apparently instigated the violence. More importantly, it failed to credit the
substantial data describing the dynamics of abuse that may lead a woman to
use a weapon in self defense.21 3 A fuller understanding of the nature of
abuse would recognize that an employer should at least inquire whether she
used the weapon in self defense, particularly when the facts indicated that it
was her husband who was the aggressor.
206 485 A.2d 173, 175 (D.C. Ct. App. 1984).
207 Id.
208 Id. at 176.
209 id.
210 Id. at 177.
211 Id. at 179-80.
212 Id. at 179.
213 See, e.g., Leigh Goodmark, When is a Battered Woman Not a Battered Woman?
When She Fights Back, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 75, 92 (2008).
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2. The Bias in Silence
Historically, domestic and sexual violence have been shrouded in
silence and shame. Victims fear self-identifying because they do not want to
be associated with the many labels ascribed to those who are victims of
violence and abuse. 214 This self-censure can be traced to the historic
relegation of domestic and sexual violence to the private sphere.215 As a
result, victims often are reluctant to call law enforcement or to follow up
with prosecutors in cases in which law enforcement has been called.216 At
work, fear of the stigma associated with abuse often leads women to remain
silent about abuse.217 The historic shrouding of domestic violence in silence
may contribute to employers' impulse to rid the workplace of the problem,
rather than to engage with the victim, as she or he might in other, non-
gendered, circumstances.
214 See, e.g., SCHNEIDER, supra note 44, at 61 (discussing negative connotation
associated with battering).
215 See generally, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN.
L. REV. 973 (1991); MARTHA A. FINEMAN & ROANNE MYKITIUK, THE PUBLIC NATURE OF
PRIVATE VIOLENCE: THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC ABUSE (1994) (collecting excerpted
articles).
216 CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, SELECTED FINDINGS, RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT: REPORTING TO POLICE AND
MEDICAL ATTENTION, 1992-2000, at 2 tbl.3 (2002), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
bjs/pub/pdf/rsarp00.pdf (noting that between 1992 and 2000, sixty-four percent of rapes,
sixty-six percent of attempted rapes, and seventy-four percent of sexual assaults were not
reported to police); LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEPT. OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE BY INTIMATES (1998), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
bjs/pub/pdf/vi.pdf (stating that between 1992 and 1996, 47.8% of victims of intimate partner
violence did not report the incident to police). Of course, the decision to involve law
enforcement is complex and often informed by law enforcement's historic biases based on
race, nationality, and immigration status, as well as gender bias. See, e.g., Ammons, supra
note 183, at 1023; Crenshaw, supra note 183, at 1257; Beth E. Richie, A Black Feminist
Reflection on the Antiviolence Movement, 25 SIGNS 1133, 1136-37 (2000), available at
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3175500; Holly Maguigan, Wading into Professor Schneider's
"Murky Middle Ground" Between Acceptance and Rejection of Criminal Justice Responses
to Domestic Violence, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 427, 431-32 (2003); Jenny
Rivera, Intimate Partner Violence Strategies: Models for Community Participation, 50 ME.
L. REV. 283, 294-305 (1998).
217 See Swanberg et al., supra note 106, at 12, 21 (explaining that victims remain
silent at work in part because of stigma associated with abuse, and arguing that employers
should take steps to destigmatize abuse and encourage victims to disclose).
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This self-censorship can be problematic. 218  Employers are
increasingly becoming aware of the detrimental impact of abuse on the
workplace and are taking steps to address the problem. 219 However, a
survivor will only access programs and services if she is assured that it is
safe to disclose the abuse. Absent affirmative assurances from her employer
that she will not be penalized if she discloses, a victim is likely to stay
silent. If she does, she may suffer unexplained performance problems,
absences, or other workplace infractions that may subject her to disciplinary
action or termination. So by maintaining the status quo and not adopting a
domestic and sexual violence policy, an employer inadvertently creates an
environment in which the effects of abuse remain unchecked.
3. Victim Status
Cases in which an adverse action was based solely on an
employee's status as a domestic or sexual violence survivor present more
difficulty than those involving a similarly situated employee not in the
protected class, or those involving obviously outdated stereotypes. Absent
those types of evidence, a case may either not be commenced or may fail.
On the one hand, this is not incorrect, since domestic and sexual violence
are not per se, sex-based characteristics: both men and women can be
victims or perpetrators. Consequently, courts could determine that an
employee was terminated for the gender-neutral reason that she was a
victim. Analogous arguments have doomed many, though not all, claims by
domestic violence victims claiming that law enforcement policies treating
domestic violence claims less seriously than other analogous claims
discriminate on the basis of sex.22 °
218 By exposing the link between victims' silence at work and sex-based biases I
do not mean to suggest that gender bias drives all cases in which a victim chooses not to
disclose her circumstances at work. Certainly, non-gendered reasons, such as a preference
not to reveal personal circumstances, may define an individual's choice. However, the
connection helps explain the structural dynamic in which, absent an explicit policy, victims
are less likely to disclose and therefore more likely to be disadvantaged at work as a result of
the abuse.
219 See supra Part I.C.
220 See, e.g., Ricketts v. City of Columbia, 36 F.3d 775, 781-82 (8th Cir. 1994)
(finding a policy of fewer arrests in domestic abuse cases than nondomestic cases could be
rationally explained by "inherent differences" between those cases and rejecting
circumstantial evidence of officers' statements about not arresting batterers as "unreliable
hearsay" and insufficient to establish discriminatory animus toward women); Eagleston v.
Guido, 41 F.3d 865, 878 (2d Cir. 1994) (rejecting claim due to lack of evidence beyond
statistical evidence of low arrest rates in domestic violence cases); McKee v. City of
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Although not framed as a question of whether "victim status"
constitutes a form of protected status, several courts have raised a related
question about whether abusive conduct stemming from a "personal
relationship gone sour" falls within Title VII's sexual harassment
prohibitions. Ironically, according to some judges, the fact that the
violence and abuse was committed within an intimate relationship would
render it less likely that a subsequent employment action would be found to
be discriminatory than if the abuse had been committed between non-
intimates. For example, in the Excel Corp. v. Bosley decision discussed
previously,22 2 the Eighth Circuit upheld a sexual harassment claim based on
an employer's failure to remedy ongoing harassment by an employee's
former husband.223 In his concurring opinion, Judge Loken raised concerns,
however, about whether a "marital spat" that spills over to the workplace is
a proper basis for a sexual harassment claim. Quoting an unpublished Sixth
Circuit decision, he stated that "personal animosity is not the equivalent of
sexual harassment and is not proscribed by law. 224 Yet he recognized that
the same "misconduct" between unrelated coworkers would "quite
properly" be the basis for an inference of discrimination.2 25 Under that
view, the fact that some form of abusive conduct occurred within the
context of an intimate relationship, albeit one that ended, reduces rather
than suggests the operation of sex-based bias.
Rockwall, 877 F.2d 409, 416 (5th Cir. 1989) (finding insufficient evidence of a police
department's policy of treating domestic violence victims differently than other similarly
situated victims). But see, e.g., Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 715-17 (9th Cir. 1995)
(upholding an equal protection claim that domestic violence victims were treated less
seriously than similar non-domestic violence victims under rational basis review); Thurman
v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1529 (D. Conn. 1981) (rejecting a motion to
dismiss an equal protection claim challenging police policy of differential treatment of
domestic violence victims).
221 See, e.g., Galloway v. Gen. Motors Serv. Parts Operations, 78 F.3d 1164, 1167
(7th Cir. 1996) (holding that repeated remarks in which former partner called employee "sick
bitch" and subjected her to other verbal abuse and obscene gestures were not sex- or gender-
related); Lowry v. Powerscreen USB, Inc., No. 4:98CV00377(MLM), 1999 WL 1127409
(E.D. Mo. July 15, 1999) (rejecting sexual harassment claim based on former partner and co-
worker's abuse, concluding that harassment was based on prior relationship and not on
gender).
222 See supra notes 168-82 and accompanying text.
223 Excel Corp. v. Bosley, 165 F.3d 635, 639 (8th Cir. 1999).
224 Bosley, 165 F.3d at 641 (Loken, J., concurring) (quoting Rothenbusch v. Ford
Motor Co., No. 93-3945, 1995 WL 431012 (6th Cir. July 20, 1995)).
225 Bosley, 165 F.3d at 641 (Loken, J., concurring).
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4. Legitimate Employer Concerns
An employer may cite legitimate concerns that arguably justify
adverse actions against domestic or sexual violence victims. 226 It may state
that it terminated an employee because of the risk posed by her abusive
partner's threats.227 Or an employer may claim that an adverse action was
22justified due to an abuse victim's work performance issues. 28 These are
legitimate concerns that employers reasonably should, and in fact must, take
into account. However, since these workplace performance and safety
concerns may be generated by the sex-related dynamics of abuse, a better
understanding of these problems can help antidiscrimination law separate
cases that reflect impermissible bias from those that do not.
a. Performance Issues
It is not surprising that domestic or sexual violence victims may
experience job performance issues. Studies show that abusers use the
workplace to perpetuate abuse. 229 For example, one common form of
harassment is for an abuser to make incessant daily phone calls to his
partner's desk, keeping her on the phone for hours.23 ° It is not hard to
imagine the difficulty of performing a job in the face of such distraction. If
an employee chooses not to disclose the reasons for her performance issues,
the ramifications of abuse will appear to be her performance problem,
rather than an employment-related manifestation of abuse. To account for
the role of abuse and maintain productive employees, employers should
affirmatively adopt policies and conduct education programs so that
employees who are victims of abuse feel assured that they can self-identify
and take appropriate steps to reduce the impact of the abuse on the
workplace without fear of retaliation.23 1 Regardless of whether an employer
maintains such a policy, once an employer learns that a performance
226 These arguments could be raised either in service of proof of a legitimate
business reason defense to a disparate treatment claim, or in support of a business necessity
defense to a disparate impact claim.
227 See, e.g., Green v. Bryant, 887 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
228 See, e.g., Rohde v. K.O. Steel Castings, Inc., 649 F.2d 317, 322 (5th Cir. 1981).
229 See supra Part I.B. 1.
230 See supra notes 67-69.
23 1 For a discussion of these policies, see supra Part I.B.3.
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problem may be the result of domestic or sexual violence, the employee
should be given an opportunity to develop a safety plan before being
subjected to adverse action. To do otherwise blames the victim and
compounds her abuse. 232
The dynamics of abuse operate to produce performance problems
for victims in additional ways. In some cases, an employee's frustration
with her abuser's workplace harassment, coupled with an employer's failed
responses, may lead the victim to take some action that violates a workplace
conduct rule and subjects her to discipline or termination. For example, in
the Excel Corporation v. Bosley case discussed above, an employee who
was repeatedly harassed by her coworker ex-husband was terminated for
"having struck a supervisor" when she pushed past a supervisor to enter the
room where her ex-husband was located.233 Although she may have violated
a workplace rule, she did so in the context of a longstanding pattern of
abuse, her supervisor's refusal to accommodate her requests for relief from
the harassment, and a meeting in which she was subjected to discipline for
pushing her ex-husband in an attempt to get him out of her area and back to
his appointed workplace. 34 Similarly, in Lowry v. Powerscreen USB, Inc.,
an employee was terminated for falsifying a "return to work" slip after she
took a job leave to address the medical ramifications of her abuse.235
Although the petitioner did not contest the fact that she violated a
workplace rule, the court failed to recognize the difficulty of complying
with workplace rules while simultaneously negotiating abuse.
b. Workplace Safety
Employers also may justify adverse actions against domestic or
sexual violence victims based on concerns about workplace safety and
avoiding workplace disruption. For example, the employer cited safety
concerns as the reason for Philloria Green's termination from her job in a
doctor's office after she informed her employer that her estranged husband
raped and severely beat her with a pipe at gunpoint.236 The court upheld her
termination, which was based solely on her employer's apparent fears of the
232 For a fuller discussion of this dynamic, see supra Part I.B. 1.
... 165 F.3d 635, 638 (8th Cir. 1999).
234 Id.
235 No. 4:98CV00377(MLM), 1999 WL 1127409 (E.D. Mo. July 15, 1999).
236 Green v. Bryant, 887 F. Supp. 798, 798-800 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
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potential physical or emotional danger to other employees or patients if
plaintiff's estranged husband came to the workplace and engaged in further
violence.237 Similarly, in Hossack v. Floor Covering Associates, the
Seventh Circuit upheld the termination of an employee based on her
employer's concerns that her husband's threats would disrupt the
workplace.238
An employer's concern is understandable given its obligation to
take reasonable steps to safeguard the workplace from known threats.239
However, the reflexive termination of the victim of abuse without inquiring
whether removing her in fact would increase workplace safety is not the
appropriate response. Abuse in this case distorts the analysis, and increases
the likelihood that adverse actions will be taken against the victim,
regardless of whether termination is warranted under the circumstances.
Workplace safety concerns should not be underestimated or summarily
dismissed.240 Nevertheless, a stated concern for safety may also constitute a
pretext for discrimination. Ingrained attitudes and lack of understanding
about the nature of abuse and the utility of safety plans, as well as
legitimate fears about safety, may lead employers to reflexively penalize the
victim without inquiring whether the adverse action is required, or whether
some other, less extreme intervention could both protect workplace safety
and the employee's job status. A stated concern for safety should not justify
terminating an employee absent further inquiry and negotiation about
whether termination in fact is the appropriate remedy.
IlI. PROPOSAL: ACCOUNTING FOR THE REALITIES OF
DISCRIMINATION
The previous Parts demonstrate how employment decisions
disadvantage victims of domestic and sexual violence without adequately
accounting for the role of abuse and its connections with sex discrimination.
These cases raise the question of how connections between domestic and
sexual violence and sex discrimination should be taken into account in
cases in which the victim suffers some adverse job action but traditional
237 Id. at 800-01.
238 492 F.3d 853, 863 (7th Cir. 2007).
239 See supra note 87 (discussing employers' obligations under tort law).
240 Id. Experts recommend workplace policies that encourage employee disclosure
and safety planning to reduce the risk that an abusive partner will commit an act of violence
at work. See supra Part I.B.3.
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indicia of discrimination, beyond the victim's abuse experience, are not
present. All too often, the victim, most often a woman, is reflexively
disciplined or terminated with no analysis of the connection between the
abuse and prohibited discrimination. This renders invisible both the
relationship between domestic and sexual violence and sex discrimination
and the ways gender bias informs and distorts employers' reactions to
victims. 24' On the other hand, an absolute equation of domestic or sexual
violence with sex discrimination would be inappropriate. In addition to
concerns that may be raised about whether an adverse action taken against a
domestic or sexual violence victim necessarily reflects discrimination
"because of sex," a flat equation would not adequately account for the cases
in which domestic or sexual violence survivors nevertheless were justifiably
disciplined or terminated.
This Part offers a proposal for how antidiscrimination law can
better account for the subtle bias associated with domestic and sexual
violence while recognizing employers' legitimate interests in employee
performance and workplace safety. It does this by making the implicit,
hidden dynamics explicit, thus creating a check that impermissible bias is
not at play. Consequently, the proposal requires employers and employees
to discuss the actual, rather than presumed, role of abuse. This would both
counter the operation of subtle stereotypes and ensure that adverse actions
would only be taken when justified by the facts. Accordingly, unexplained
adverse actions taken against survivors of domestic or sexual violence
would raise an inference of discrimination that could be rebutted by proof
that the employer engaged in a good faith negotiation with the employee
and nevertheless determined that the adverse action was required. This Part
will discuss each aspect of this proposal.
A. Adverse Actions and Inferences of Discrimination
The close connection between domestic and sexual violence and
sex discrimination raises the difficult question of whether the fact that an
employee was abused, without more, should lead to finding adverse
treatment impermissible because of her sex. If the charge of
antidiscrimination law is to eliminate discrimination "because of" protected
characteristics such as sex, and if domestic and sexual violence victims are
subjected to abuse because of their sex, and face responses at work that are,
at least in the aggregate, overly determined by gender, the answer to this
question must be "yes" in at least some subset of these cases. On the other
241 For further discussion of these dynamics, see supra Part I.B.1.
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hand, not every adverse action taken against a domestic or sexual violence
victim is taken "because of sex"; legitimate concerns about performance
and safety may require disciplinary action in some cases.
Evolving understandings about the operation of implicit bias
suggest that pervasive, albeit unconscious, stereotypes about victims may
permeate decisions regarding their employment status. The cases described
above reveal at least two types of problems with employer responses to
employees who are coping with abuse. In one set of cases, biases impact
employment decisions through nuanced and unrecognized stereotypes that
are not captured under current antidiscrimination frameworks.242 In the
other, biases and stigma operate to silence victims and keep them from
disclosing their circumstances and negotiating for modest workplace
modifications that could facilitate job retention.243
As described in Part I.A, recent scholarship on "second generation"
discrimination and "implicit bias" endorses using the law to more
effectively address structural discrimination and subtle bias. For example,
Linda Krieger and Susan Fiske propose prohibitions on implicitly biased
behavior as one way to broaden the reach of antidiscrimination law. 2"
Christine Jolls and Cass Sunstein argue that legal rules can address implicit
bias either by insulating employment decisions from the impact of bias, or
by directly targeting implicit bias.245 Susan Sturm proposes problem-solving
solutions that are directed at the structural biases that maintain
discriminatory practices.246 These approaches need not be mutually
exclusive.247
These approaches suggest that antidiscrimination law can do a
better job of making visible and policing the implicit sex bias that impacts
domestic and sexual violence victims' employment.248 Statutory reform
explicitly prohibiting discrimination against victims could accomplish this
242 See supra Part II.B. 1.
243 See supra Part II.B.2.
244 Krieger & Fiske, supra note 30, at 1060-61.
245 Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 31, at 977-87 (discussing "direct debiasing").
246 See Sturm, supra note 3, at 468-71.
247 See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 31, at 985 (discussing how affirmative action
plans can both insulate decisions from the impact of bias, and can directly reduce bias).
248 See supra Part 11.13 for a discussion of workplace biases.
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directly.249 But employers' treatment of domestic and sexual violence
victims implicates sex discrimination laws as well. As argued in Part I.A,
there is a value in making explicit the links between the adverse action and
sex discrimination. 250 As the cases and previous discussion demonstrate, the
circumstances in which domestic and sexual violence are committed, the
reactions of victims, and the responses victims receive from institutional
officials, including employers, may be inextricably infused with sex-based
bias. Just as with other allegations of bias, it may be difficult to assess
whether a particular employment decision was consciously motivated by
bias. Yet the charge of antidiscrimination law is to make those distinctions.
In other contexts, antidiscrimination law overcomes the challenge by
assigning liability where there is some evidence of bias (for example, either
an unexplained differential treatment of similarly situated employees,
circumstantial evidence of bias, or a facially neutral policy with a disparate
impact on a particular group), and the elimination of valid business
justifications. 251 Accordingly, disparate treatment claims fail if the employer
establishes a legitimate business reason and disparate impact claims fail if
the employer can prove business necessity. 252
In the context of cases involving gender violence,
antidiscrimination law can directly target implicit bias by recognizing the
ways sex-based biases infuse employer decisions concerning domestic and
sexual violence. It can do this by recognizing a cause of action where there
is an unexplained adverse action taken against a domestic or sexual
violence victim because of her status as a victim. This would have the effect
of requiring employers to engage with the employee and to consider the
actual, rather than presumed, role of the abuse. A second part of this
249 See supra Part I.B.2 for a discussion of gaps found in existing statutes.
250 See supra text accompanying notes 32-43.
251 See, e.g., Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 580 (1978) (explaining
that the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case raises an inference of discriminatory motives
because the acts, if unexplained, are likely based on impermissible factors).
252 Sexual harassment claims do not fall easily into either category. Instead, the
Supreme Court's treatment of sexual harassment claims more closely resembles the high
explanatory burden courts impose on employers upon a showing of facial discrimination.
Presumably, sexual harassment in the workplace will never have a legitimate business
justification, thus vicarious liability is warranted where a supervisor takes an adverse action
against a target of harassment, and imposing liability where there is no tangible employment
action, but where the employer fails to satisfy the affirmative defense. See Burlington Indus.
v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764-65 (1998); see also Faraghar v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.
775, 807-08 (1998).
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proposal would deem it to be a form of discrimination if an employer
refused to make modest accommodations to a victim in order to facilitate
her safe and productive employment in the face of the abuse. Employers
that take an adverse action after ascertaining that no such modification was
possible, or that a performance or safety issue persisted notwithstanding the
modification, would not be subject to liability.
This modification would constitute an additional way of
establishing sex discrimination in disparate treatment cases involving
adverse actions against victims of domestic or sexual violence.2 13 Courts
would recognize an unexplained adverse action against a victim of domestic
or sexual violence as raising an inference of discrimination that the
employer then could rebut through proof that it engaged in an interactive
process with the employee and nevertheless could not resolve the
employment-related concem.
Employers can draw from established and workable definitions
used in other contexts to determine what circumstances, and which
employees, would be covered. Standard definitions of domestic and sexual
violence include physical and sexual violence, as well as threats of violence
and associated emotional abuse. 4  Claims by male victims, both
253 Although there is variation in the terms courts and commentators use, disparate
treatment can be established through the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework,
mixed-motive frameworks, or through "direct" evidence of discrimination. See, e.g.,
LARSON, supra note 127, at § 8.07. This proposal raises the question whether the modified
framework proposed in this Article should apply in cases other than those involving gender
violence. Although a full analysis of that question is beyond the scope of this Article, the
approach may be useful in other circumstances in which the conduct at issue is highly
correlated with gender or another form of bias, such as cases involving dress codes and
grooming standards, or adverse actions based on an employee's family or caregiver
responsibilities.
254 For example, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention recently issued
guidelines that define intimate partner violence to include physical and sexual violence,
threats of physical and sexual violence, and psychological and emotional abuse that occur in
the context of prior physical or sexual violence. LINDA E. SALTZMAN, ET AL., CENTERS FOR
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE SURVEILLANCE: UNIFORM
DEFINITIONS AND RECOMMENDED DATA ELEMENTS 11-13 (2002), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/pub-res/ipvsurveillance/Intimate%20Partner%20Violence.pdf
The Violence Against Woman Reauthorization Act of 2005 similarly defines "domestic
violence" to include felony or misdemeanor crimes of violence committed by a "current or
former spouse of the victim, by a person with whom the victim shares a child in common, by
a person who is cohabitating with or has cohabitated with the victim as a spouse, by a person
similarly situated to a spouse of the victim under the domestic or family violence laws of the
jurisdiction receiving grant monies, or by any other person against an adult or youth victim
who is protected from that person's acts under the domestic or family violence laws of the
jurisdiction." 109 Pub. L. 162, 119 Stat. 2965, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13925 (2009). New
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heterosexual and gay, would be subject to the same analysis, as stereotypes
about abuse apply to them as well.255 However, employers should not
require a criminal indictment, prosecution, or conviction, recognizing that
these crimes continue to be underreported and under-prosecuted. 5
Critics may raise concerns that this approach is overly broad, since
not every act of domestic or sexual violence can be shown to be informed
by gender bias. That critique misses the point. This proposal does not
require courts to investigate whether there is sufficient evidence of gender
bias in a particular act of domestic or sexual violence to warrant a finding of
sex discrimination. 257 It focuses instead on institutional, i.e., employer,
responses to circumstances in which employees are grappling with domestic
and sexual violence. It rests on the premise that domestic and sexual
violence is sufficiently over-determined by gender, both in the commission
of the act or acts and in institutional responses, to warrant an inference that
adverse actions may be grounded in bias.2 58 That inference invites inquiry
and examination, rather than reflexive actions that may reflect and
perpetuate bias. A showing that the adverse action was justified would
negate the inference. By incorporating a threshold requirement that an
employee in good faith asserts that she has suffered acts that constitute
domestic or sexual violence, this proposal ensures that cases of de minimus"personal" disputes between intimate partners would not alone bring an
employee within the reach of antidiscrimination laws. 59
York State's Model Domestic Violence and the Workplace Policy similarly defines domestic
violence as "a pattern of coercive tactics, which can include physical, psychological, sexual,
economic and emotional abuse, perpetrated by one person against an adult intimate partner,
with the goal of establishing and maintaining power and control over the victim." State of
N.Y. Model Domestic Violence and the Workplace Policy, http://www.opdv.state.
ny.us/workplace/statepolicy.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2009).
255 Male victims may be even more vulnerable to biased stereotypes since their
experience defies the traditional role of male as aggressor. See infra notes 260-262 and
accompanying text.
256 See supra notes 213-215 and accompanying text.
257 In this way, this proposal is different from schemes, such as that incorporated
in the federal Violence Against Women Act's civil rights remedy declared unconstitutional
in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), which predicated civil rights liability on a
finding of gender motivation in acts such as domestic or sexual violence.
258 See supra notes 44-54 and accompanying text.
259 Accordingly, this proposal addresses the concerns of those such as Judge
Loken in the Bosley case discussed supra, at notes 223-24 and accompanying text.
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Nor would this proposal render the employer responsible for
employees' personal choices or relationships. As with other areas in which
employees' personal circumstances affect the workplace, the employer
would be responsible only for ensuring that it does not discriminate, either
intentionally or through the operation of subtle biases, against the
employees.
This approach would apply to adverse employment actions taken
against male as well as female victims of domestic and sexual violence.260
Gender bias skews traditional views about male as well as female victims of
domestic violence, particularly in cases of gay male victims.261 Since male
victims often defy the common conception of men as aggressors and
women as victims, male victims may be subjected to biased responses by
employers. Consequently, cases in which male victims claim adverse
treatment as a result of their abuse also may be unduly skewed by gender
bias.262 As a result, these cases should be subject to the same analysis, to
ensure that the decision is grounded in legitimate concerns, rather than in
impermissible bias.
Under this framework, employers would be liable only for
unexplained adverse actions taken against domestic or sexual violence
victims because of their status as victims. Accordingly, it would encourage
employers to engage in an interactive process with an employee about the
effect of abuse on her employment. Through this process, which is
described more fully in the next subpart, the employer and employee could
ascertain whether any modest workplace modifications could address
legitimate workplace concerns such as performance or safety. In that way,
the law woulO mirror and incentivize recommended practices, which
Allegations based on "personal animosity" or of a "relationship gone sour," absent other
indications of abuse, would not bring an employee into the ambit of this proposal.
260 As discussed above, women constitute the vast majority of victims of domestic
and sexual violence. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
261 See, e.g., NATIONAL COALITION OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, LESBIAN, GAY,
BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2006 6-7, 12-13
(2007), available at http://www.avp.org/publications/reports/documents/2007NCAVP
DVREPORT.pdf (reporting data about domestic violence in same sex relationships and
discussing the role of gender, as well as other forms of bias, in the treatment of lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgender victims).
262 See, e.g., Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202-03 (9th Cir. 2000)
(recognizing that prison rape of male-to-female transsexual was motivated by gender, and
reviewing literature detailing gendered stereotypes associated with prison rapes of male
inmates).
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promote safety in the workplace and maintain valued employees' economic
and physical security.
B. Scope of the Interactive Process
This proposal posits that treating domestic or sexual violence as a
neutral circumstance unconnected to sex discrimination effectively colludes
with and perpetuates gender bias. Requiring an employer to engage with an
employee about how best to address the abuse would help ensure that a
legitimate reason rather than subtle or implicit bias underlies an adverse
263employment action. This type of interactive negotiation, in combination
with a requirement that employers implement modest workplace
modifications to facilitate employees' safe and productive employment, is
consistent with the model practices advocated by human resource and
management professionals. 264 The approach draws from the interactive
process and reasonable accommodations required under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA),26 5 as well as the related process associated with
Title VII's prohibition of religious discrimination.
2 66
Accordingly, when an employee discloses that she has experienced
abuse, the employer would be required to engage with her in a specific and
explicit discussion of the workplace responses that could assist her in
263 This proposal is similar to reforms put forth to address persistent discrimination
against caregivers. See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Public Law and Private Process: Toward
an Incentivized Organizational Justice Model of Equal Employment Quclity for Caregivers,
2007 UTAH L. REV. 25 (advocating requirement that employers engage h, interactive process
with employees as an "organizational justice" approach to advancing workplace equality for
caregivers).
264 See supra Part I.B.3 (discussing model policies); see also Sturm, supra note 3,
at 559 (noting cases in which courts look to "best practices" to inform legal norms in
particular cases).
261 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2009) (defining "discrimination" to include
failure to make reasonable accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of an
otherwise qualified individual with a disability, unless the accommodation would impose an
undue hardship); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (defining "reasonable accommodation" and
suggesting that in order to determine the appropriate accommodation, the covered entity may
have to initiate an "informal, interactive process" with the qualified individual).
166 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (defining "religion" to include all aspects of religious
observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that it is unable
to reasonably accommodate an employee's religious observance or practice without undue
hardship).
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negotiating both the abuse and her job.267 Thus, this approach would
remove the reflexive judgments and misconceptions from employment
decisions concerning abuse, and instead would ground those decisions in a
realistic and practical balancing of employee and employer needs and
concerns. This approach is consistent with feminist theory, in its
requirement of interaction and dialogue.268 It is also in keeping with the
dynamic approach advocated by Sturm, in which "regulatory" participants
within the workplace engage with the specific dynamics at play in each case
to solve workplace problems.269 It exemplifies an intervention that would
directly prohibit implicitly biased behavior, as advocated by Jolls and
Sunstein.27 °
The proposed interactive process and the possibility of modest
modification would help defeat the operation of bias in at least two ways.
First, it would help to ensure that the employer's actions were based on
legitimate business concerns, rather than on stereotypes about abuse by
requiring employers to make their rationale for adverse actions against
267 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9, at 414 (Appendix:
Interpretive Guidance). The EEOC Reasonable Accommodation Guidance recommends the
following, flexible, four-step process:
(1) Analyze the particular job involved and determine its purpose and
essential functions; (2) Consult with the individual with a disability to
ascertain the precise job-related limitations imposed by the individual's
disability and how those limitations could be overcome with a
reasonable accommodation; (3) In consultation with the individual to be
accommodated, identify potential accommodations and assess the
effectiveness each would have in enabling the individual to perform the
essential functions of the position; and (4) Consider the preference of the
individual to be accommodated and select and implement the
accommodation that is most appropriate for both the employee and the
employer.
Id.
The scope of required modifications is discussed under the approach proposed
infra at Part lll.C.
268 See Carlos A. Ball, Looking for Theory in All the Right Places: Feminist and
Communitarian Elements of Disability Discrimination Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 105, 147-49
(2005).
269 Sturm, supra note 3, at 462-63.
270 See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 31, at 986.
Columbia Journal of Gender and Law
domestic or sexual violence victims explicit. 271 It would help counter the
operation of bias in a second way as well. As described in Part II, supra,
part of the legacy of gender bias and abuse is its silencing effect. This
silence is often counterproductive, because it prevents an employee from
enlisting the assistance of her employer, which can be critical.272 By
requiring a legitimate justification and modest accommodations for abuse-
related employment decisions, antidiscrimination law would signal to
employees that they would not be retaliated against merely for disclosing
the abuse. This interpretation of the sex discrimination prohibition in the
case of domestic and sexual violence would counter the silence historically
associated with abuse and would encourage the self-disclosure that
facilitates effective safety planning.
Accordingly, as with the interactive process commended under the
ADA, an employer would only be required to engage in an interactive
process with an employee about her experience with abuse if the employee
voluntarily disclosed the abuse and informed her employer of the need for
an accommodation.273 This would ensure an employee's autonomy and
privacy, and her ability to control her employer's intervention in her
personal life.274 Of course, as Tarr argues, the question whether to disclose
one's experience with abuse to an employer is not simple, and an
employee's legal protection should not simply be cast in terms of whether
she was "willing to leave her abuser or accept any help from her
employer." 275 Nevertheless, an employee will be more likely to disclose in
271 See Sturm, supra note 3, at 496 (discussing Deloitte & Touche's strategy of
making the performance review and promotion process visible and accountable).
272 Although disclosing abuse and enlisting an employer's assistance may be
helpful, it is not appropriate in all instances. By endorsing policies that encourage disclosure,
this proposal would in no way require employees to disclose their circumstances or to
engage with their employer as a condition of continued employment or assistance. The
decision of whether and with whom to share information about her abuse must at all times
remain with the victim. See Tarr, supra note 23, at 409 (discussing importance of victim
autonomy and agency in all policy approaches).
273 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (app.) (noting that an employer would not be
expected to accommodate disabilities of which it is unaware); see also EEOC, Reasonable
Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the ADA, http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/
accommodation (last visited Apr. 8, 2009) (discussing process by which employee must
request accommodation, and noting that the employee need not mention the ADA or use the
words "reasonable accommodation").
274 See Tarr, supra note 23, at 398.
275 Id. at 373, 392. Tarr critiques Porter's framing of the problem as
"pathologiz[ing]" the victim, assuming that separation is the only viable option, ignoring the
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an environment with a clearly articulated policy that explains the
employer's recognition of the role of abuse, its support for victims, and that
the employer will not retaliate in any way against an employee who
discloses.
This approach would not guarantee employment for all domestic
and sexual violence victims. If an employer could establish that it engaged
in a good faith negotiation with an employee and determined that no
reasonable accommodation could address the concerns, any adverse action
then would not be considered "because of sex." Thus, for example, if an
employee's performance suffered and she claimed that the problems
stemmed from her abusive partner's incessant phone calls, a workplace
modification might entail changing her phone number so that he could not
reach her.276 If her performance problems nevertheless persisted, and her
employer established that she could not adequately or safely perform the
job despite good faith negotiations and any reasonable attempt at workplace
modifications, the employer would overcome the adverse inference and the
claim would not succeed.277 The key to this modified approach is the
requirement that the employer's response is explicit and considered. By
requiring an employer to engage with an employee about how it could
accommodate the abuse, antidiscrimination law would go a long way
toward reducing the shame that still accompanies domestic and sexual
violence while enhancing the possibility of employee retention and
complexity of leaving an abuser and as giving the employer too much power over an
employee's personal life and choices. Id. I agree that conditioning legal protection on a
victim's disclosure to her employer, or on a blanket requirement that she take some specific
step, such as obtaining an order of protection or leaving her abuser, dramatically and
inaccurately oversimplifies the issue. Employers should encourage, not mandate, disclosure
and can best do so through widely publicized and well-enforced policies assuring victims
that they will not summarily be subjected to adverse actions without an assessment of
whether modest accommodations were possible. Before an employer requires an employee
to take a particular step the employer thinks would promote safety, the employer should
engage with the employee about what step or steps she believes would best prevent violence
at work, and best help her maintain required performance levels.
276 Examples of modifications that have been found to be effective are discussed
in Part I.B.3, supra.
277 This requirement should be interpreted flexibly and reasonably. For example,
in a case of domestic violence where the violence escalates over time, the employee and the
employer would engage in a dialogue about how best to address the problem. The nature of
the interactive process and the scope of modifications might be modified over time to
account for the changing nature of the abuse. However, an employer could take into account
previous accommodations when evaluating the appropriate response to a circumstance
involving escalating abuse.
20081
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workplace safety. In this sense, the approach is consistent with other
process-oriented proposals to address discrimination.278
C. Scope of Required Accommodations
This proposal advocates importing an ADA-like accommodation
requirement into Title VII's sex discrimination prohibition to eliminate
artificial barriers to women's equality created by domestic and sexual
violence. 279 As with the disabled, or with those who require workplace
accommodations of their religious beliefs, modest workplace modifications
may be needed to ensure that victims of domestic and sexual violence can
fully participate at work, notwithstanding their experience with abuse.2 s°
The notion of importing an accommodation requirement to Title
VII's sex discrimination prohibition is not novel. The accommodation could
be required either through judicial interpretation or through statutory
amendment. Although statutory amendment no doubt would make the
obligation more explicit, judicial interpretation could reach the same result
without the political difficulties of legislative reform.28' Nor is the notion of
278 See, e.g., Arnow-Richman, supra note 263.
279 For discussion of antidiscrimination law's accommodation requirements, see
Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642 (2001);
Peggy Smith, Accommodating Routine Parental Obligations in an Era of Work-Family
Conflict: Lessons from Religious Accommodations, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 1443. Like
childrearing accommodations, the accommodations suited to domestic and sexual violence
victims may be more similar to those sought under religious accommodation case law than
the structural and often physical modifications often sought under the ADA. See Smith,
supra, at 1474-78 (discussing modifications such as lateral transfers, voluntary substitutes
and swaps, and flexible scheduling).
280 The question of whether the accommodation model used in the religious
discrimination or disability discrimination context should apply is difficult given the
Supreme Court's cramped interpretations of both. See Joan Williams & Nancy Segal,
Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relieffor Family Caregivers who are Discriminated Against on
the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 77, 83-85 (2003) (reviewing literature and discussing
problems with both statutory frameworks).
281 The history of Title VII's religious discrimination prohibition provides a useful
example. The accommodation requirement originated in an EEOC guideline that interpreted
Title VII's antidiscrimination prohibition to require employers to accommodate employees'
religious needs. See Alan D. Schuchman, The Holy and the Handicapped: An Examination
of the Different Applications of the Reasonable-Accommodation Clauses in Title VII and the
ADA, 73 IND. L.J. 745, 748-51 (1998) (tracing the history of the religious discrimination
accommodation requirement). The judicially imposed mandate was rejected due to concerns
that requiring businesses to accommodate employees' religious preferences and practices
would impose employee's religious beliefs on their employer, and could violate the
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a judicially created defense to liability novel; the Supreme Court has
devised just that type of defense in other types of sex discrimination
claims.282 In related contexts, commentators have proposed a general duty
to reasonably accommodate caregiving needs, comparable to the
accommodation requirement for disabilities and religious beliefs.283
The suggestion embodies a substantive equality interpretation of
Title VII's antidiscrimination prohibition. It takes into account the realities
of the workplace responses needed to place all workers on equal footing. It
would normalize employees' requests for modest modifications to cope
with abuse, and would incentivize employer policies granting
accommodations. This proposal would not open the door to requiring an
interactive process and accompanying accommodation in all Title VII cases.
It is a limited proposal in that it would apply to circumstances so closely
related to the experience of impermissible biases as to require a closer look
before an adverse action is taken.
The ADA provides the best guidance for the scope of the required
modification, since it contemplates a multi-faceted, fact-intensive inquiry
that balances financial cost, administrative burden, complexity of
implementation, and other negative impacts on the employer's business.2 84
Of course, the ADA's accommodation requirement has been roundly
criticized as, among other things, imposing uncertain and burdensome
administrative and financial responsibilities on employers, 285 and as
Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 334-36 (6th
Cir. 1970), aff'd 402 U.S. 689 (1971) (4-4 decision with Harlan, J., not participating). That
concern about the appropriate limits of employer decisions about religion is not raised in the
domestic violence context, and nothing in the decisions surrounding interpretation of Title
VII's religious discrimination prohibition before Title VII's statutory amendment requiring
accommodation would bar judicial requirement of an accommodation here.
282 For example, the Supreme Court has recognized an affirmative defense to
sexual harassment claims. See Faraghar v. City of Boca Raton 524 U.S. 775, 804 (1998);
Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
283 See, e.g., Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination
Law, Women's Cultural Caregiving and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Legal Theory,
34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 371, 457-59 (2001); Smith, supra note 278; cf Arnow-Richman,
supra note 262, at 43-44 (critiquing proposals as creating significant uncertainty and
administrative difficulties for employers, and as producing backlash reflecting judicial lack
of commitment to the ADA's transformative mission).
284 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2009);
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p).
285 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Justin Nelson, Discrimination with a
Difference: Can Employment Discrimination Law Accommodate the Americans with
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producing general backlash from the business community against
286antidiscrimination norms. As a substantive, as opposed to political,
matter, these concerns should not prevent courts from requiring modest
accommodations to advance antidiscrimination law's broad mandate to
eliminate artificial barriers to equality.
No doubt, the proposed interactive process and accommodations
will impose costs on employers. However, those costs generally will be
modest. Most employers have found that low- to no-cost modifications such
as changing phone numbers, worksite locations, shift adjustments, or
application of leave policies to domestic or sexual violence related
appointments go a long way toward facilitating a victim's safe and
productive continued employment.287 The difficulty lies in assessing the
appropriateness of a particular accommodation, which would be evaluated
based on the particular needs and resources of an employee and her
employer. That assessment, including the assessment of when safety
concerns outweigh an employee's interest in continued employment, no
doubt may be difficult in any given case.288 But it is the type of assessment
in which employers of all sizes routinely engage. As a matter of equality,
an employer's response to a disclosure of abuse should be deliberate and
rational, rather than reflexive and automatic, to guard against the potential
to reinforce and reinscribe subtle gender-based bias.
Disabilities Act?, 79 N.C. L. REv. 307, 347-55 (2001); Jerry L. Mashaw, Against First
Principles, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 211, 219 (2004).
286 See, e.g., Arnow-Richman, supra note 263, at 43-44.
287 See supra Part I.B.3. For example, common workplace adjustments, such as
changing a phone number or worksite location, impose virtually no costs on an employer.
Other adjustments, such as scheduling changes, may have some financial impact; their
reasonableness would be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, depending on the size and type
of employer, in the same way that accommodations are evaluated under Title VII's religious
discrimination prohibition, and under the ADA.
288 In assessing the severity of safety threats stemming from gender violence,
employers can rely on the same type of guideposts they employ in other cases involving risks
of workplace safety. In this context, experts conclude that an explicit and comprehensive
policy that takes seriously the victim's assessment of the severity of the risk is the approach
best suited to prevent violent incidents from occurring at work and to reduce the risk of
liability. See supra Part IIl.C. Ignoring the risk of violence, or automatically removing
employees who are victims of abuse, is not rationally tailored to the risk.
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D. Why Statutory Interpretation and Not Legislative Reform?
This proposal calls for a modified interpretation of
antidiscrimination law's current concept of sex discrimination, not new
statutory reform that would explicitly prohibit adverse actions against
survivors of gender violence. Due to the uncertainty surrounding whether
antidiscrimination laws will cover the circumstances faced by domestic and
sexual violence victims, some jurisdictions have enacted abuse-specific
laws to address the challenges victims face in the workplace. Some of these
laws cover leave, unemployment, and other provisions that will assist
domestic and sexual assault survivors. 89 Others specifically prohibit
discrimination against domestic and sexual violence survivors.29 °
Strong arguments based on the traditional justifications for
antidiscrimination protections support the inclusion of domestic and sexual
violence in antidiscrimination provisions. For example, antidiscrimination
protection has been justified based on factors such as a history of
discrimination, economic disadvantage, and employer discrimination that
causes or contributes to economic disadvantage. 29 1 The statistics described
in Part I, detailing the biases against victims, the economic disadvantages
domestic and sexual violence produces, and the nexus between treatment at
work and economic disadvantage, support inclusion.
On the other hand, a number of objections have been raised to these
proposals. Some have argued that the coverage would be duplicative of the
protection afforded under other antidiscrimination provisions, such as those
prohibiting discrimination based on disability.2 92 It is true that some
domestic and sexual violence victims may suffer physical or psychological
disabilities as a result of abuse that would qualify under disability
discrimination prohibitions.293 But not all will. Limiting coverage to those
victims who experience a cognizable disability as a result fails to recognize
the varied realities of abuse.
289 See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
290 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
291 MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION 32 (6th ed. 2003).
292 See Marta B. Varela, Protection of Domestic Violence Victims Under the New
York City Human Rights Law's Provisions Prohibiting Discrimination on the Basis of
Disability, 27 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 1231 (2000).
293 See Porter, supra note 59, at 305-08.
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Others argue that antidiscrimination laws are not necessary because
they inadequately safeguard workplace safety and because voluntary
policies better allow employers to adopt flexible responses on a case-by-
case basis. 9 While voluntary efforts should be applauded, history shows
that not all employers will adopt recommended policies absent legal
requirements. 95  With respect to safety concerns, antidiscrimination
provisions should be interpreted to require an employer to respectfully
acknowledge the impact of abuse on the battered employee, and to work
with her to strategize how she can keep her job. This would not, however,
result in blanket job protection for all employed victims of abuse, since
employers could avoid liability if they terminated an abused employee after
good faith efforts to secure her job and workplace safety proved
unsuccessful.
From a different perspective, some have raised concerns that
domestic and sexual violence victims are unlike other groups covered by
antidiscrimination laws. Widiss argues that "domestic violence victim
status" is not a personal characteristic; it is a descriptive statement of a
circumstance to which an individual has been subjected.296 However, as
Widiss points out, immutability is not a requirement of protected class
status.297 Indeed, as our understanding of the nature of impermissible bias
evolves, it makes sense that the categories of protected groups also change
to more effectively rout impermissible discrimination.
Widiss also invokes the practical realities of the political opposition
to expanding protected status classifications. 298 This is no small
consideration when weighing strategic decisions about where to place
scarce resources and lobbying efforts. However, this should not preclude
legislative reform as a substantive or normative matter.
294 See, e.g., Sue K. Willman, Too Much, Too Long? Domestic Violence in the
Workplace, Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Employment and
Workplace Safety 8-9, 12-13 (Apr. 17, 2007), http://help.senate.gov/Hearings/2007 04 17/
Willman.pdf.
295 For example, although some employers voluntarily adopted anti-sexual
harassment policies, it was not until courts held that sexual harassment was a form of
prohibited sex discrimination and, in particular, that policies could play a role in insulating
employers from liability, that policies became widespread. See, e.g., Goldscheid, supra note
44 (tracing policy development); see also supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
296 Widiss, supra note 56, at 707-08.
297 id.
298 Id. at 708-09.
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Legislative reform that explicitly prohibits discrimination on the
basis of domestic or sexual violence victim status can help victims in a
number of ways. Such laws will squarely define prohibited conduct. They
may galvanize employer policies that assist, rather than penalize victims.
They also can draw needed attention to the issue and can expand education
and awareness campaigns. These are critical reforms, particularly if courts
do not recognize the full scope of sex discrimination that domestic and
sexual violence produces. However, amendments to antidiscrimination laws
adding survivors of gender violence as an additional protected category
could fuel arguments that the meaning of those categories has become
hopelessly diluted and that the justification for additional new categories is
unclear and amorphous. For those who favor coverage, adding a new
protected category may also serve as a shortcut that allows employers,
policymakers, and courts to sidestep grappling with the pernicious and
persistent vestiges of sex discrimination as it manifests through domestic
and sexual abuse and the treatment of survivors. From that perspective,
statutory reforms should not substitute for a more robust and accurate
interpretation of sex discrimination prohibitions.
IV. CONCLUSION
Workplace discrimination persists despite decades of
antidiscrimination statutory protection. The workplace ramifications of
domestic and sexual violence exemplify one way in which current
antidiscrimination frameworks fail to address the realities of discrimination.
Notwithstanding that domestic and sexual violence reflect historic sex
discrimination, litigation brought by victims who have suffered adverse
employment actions may not be successful under current legal approaches.
This Article has demonstrated how subtle stereotypes and silence related to
those stereotypes inform workplace decisions involving survivors of
domestic and sexual violence. It proposes a framework in which the role of
abuse and its connection with gender bias are made transparent, while
employers retain the flexibility to terminate survivors when their safe and
productive employment cannot reasonably be accommodated. By making
explicit the ways in which domestic and sexual violence continue to be a
site of sex discrimination, employment law can more effectively address
impermissible discrimination, promote retention of valued employees, and
help domestic and sexual violence survivors attain safety and economic
security.
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